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Recent research on learning individual monologs and collaborative problem solving suggests that 
students learn best when they are required to be active participants in interactive dialogs. 
However, some interactive dialogs are more conducive to learning than others. Two dialog 
patterns that seem to be effective in producing successful problem solving and deep learning are 
elaborative and critical interactions. The goal of the present study is to evaluate the relative 
impact of each dialog on learning and problem solving by experimentally manipulating the types 
of conversations in which dyads engage. 
Undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: a singleton 
control, a dyadic control, an elaborative dyad, or a critical dyad. The domain chosen for the 
experiment was a bridge optimization task in which individuals or dyads modified a simulated 
bridge, with the goal of making it as inexpensive as possible. 
Both problem solving and learning from the simulation were assessed. Performance on 
the task included a combination of two factors: the quality of the design and the price. Overall 
learning was measured by the gain from pre- to posttest on isomorphic evaluations, and was 
further decomposed into text-explicit and inferential knowledge. The results suggest elaboration 
is easier to train and led to stronger problem solving and learning than the control condition, 
whereas the critical interactions were more difficult to instruct and led to problem solving and 
learning equal to the control condition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Certain verbalizations have been shown to lead to the modification of the underlying 
representation held by the speaker. One such verbalization, self-explaining, has been shown to be 
particularly effective in bringing about representational change during procedural and conceptual 
learning (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989a). Self-explaining might be usefully 
conceptualized as a personal monolog that results in an increased understanding of a domain 
through the modification of the underlying mental representation (Chi, 2000). The self-
explanation effect seems to be a domain-general learning strategy, given it has been shown to be 
useful for learning physics (Chi & Bassok, 1989; Chi et al., 1989a; Chi & VanLehn, 1991), the 
human circulatory system (Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Hausmann & Chi, 2002), 
probability (Renkl, 1997), calculating interest rates (Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998), Lisp 
programming (Pirolli & Bielaczyc, 1989), algebra and geometry (Aleven & Koedinger, 2000), 
and even how to use spreadsheets (Reimann & Neubert, 2000). 
Self-explaining is certainly not the only type of monolog that has been linked to learning. 
Other types of verbalizations have also been shown to facilitate the acquisition of new 
information, which include summarizing (Palincsar & Brown, 1984), self-questioning (Wong, 
1985), generating precise elaborations (Stein & Bransford, 1979), and elaborative interrogation 
(Seifert, 1993). 
On the other hand, there are types of monolog that are not associated with learning. For 
instance, in the same study that demonstrated support for the self-explanation effect, Chi et al. 
(1989a) found that paraphrasing was not correlated with learning (see also Hausmann & Chi, 
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 2002). Similarly, merely repeating facts (O'Reilly, Symons, & MacLatchy-Gaudet, 1998) and 
underlining (Seifert, 1993) have also been shown to be ineffective in producing learning gains. 
What empirical regularities arise from the studies linking individual speech with 
learning? It seems apparent that verbalization, by itself, does not lead directly to learning. 
Instead, the pattern of results suggests that only certain types of monologs are associated with 
learning. What are the commonalities among the types of monologs that correspond to learning? 
The shared feature among facilitative monologs is modification of the student’s underlying 
representation, either through the generation of new knowledge or the reorganization of prior 
knowledge. For present purposes, these types of monologs will be referred to as constructive 
monologs. Monologs might be considered constructive under three conditions. A monolog might 
be considered constructive when: a) the student processes the information at a semantic level 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972), b) it creates connections between the target material and prior 
knowledge, or c) it generates new information or modifies prior knowledge. 
While the research on constructive monologs has resulted in strong learning gains, so too 
has research on dialogs. Several studies have shown that collaborative problem solving and 
learning is superior to individual problem solving and learning. Several of those studies are 
reviewed elsewhere (E. G. Cohen, 1994; Dillenbourg, 1999; Hill, 1982; Webb & Palincsar, 
1996). Estimates of the effect sizes for the impact of collaborative learning range from σ = 0.21 
(Slavin, 1990) to σ = 0.88 (Johnson & Johnson, 1992). A targeted review is presented below to 
highlight the effects of collaboration. 
Phelps and Damon (1989) observed fourth graders’ performance on mathematic problems 
across two years. Specifically, they were interested in the children’s ability to reason about 
spatial problems (i.e., model-copying and spatial-perspective tasks) and mathematical problems 
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 (i.e., rote math and proportions). Phelps and Damon argued that the effects of peer collaboration 
were most helpful for tasks that involved problem solving. They found an advantage for 
collaboration for the spatial-reasoning tasks, but not the rote math problems or a model-copying 
task. This suggests that collaboration is especially helpful for difficult problems. 
Okada and Simon (1997) found similar results for a scientific-discovery task. They 
contrasted dyadic and individual scientific discovery on a computer simulation of a molecular 
genetics laboratory (Dunbar, 1993). Participants were asked to discover gene regulation either 
independently or collaboratively. Using a nominal groups analysis (i.e., non-interacting groups 
matched for the number of members), Okada and Simon found dyads were more successful in 
finding the correct inhibition hypothesis than the nominal individuals. 
These studies suggest that collaboration can be an important tool for learning and 
problem solving. To understand why there is an advantage for collaboration, research has turned 
to the interactions in which the groups engage. Several types of dialog have been shown to be 
effective, but the present study will focus exclusively on the interactions between relative 
novices of approximately symmetrical knowledge. In other words, interactions between non-
peers such as tutorial dialogs, which have been considered elsewhere (Chi, Siler, Jeong, 
Yamauchi, & Hausmann, 2001), will not be reviewed here. In the next two sections, an argument 
is made for the inclusion of critical and elaborative interactions as constructive dialogs. 
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1.1. THE IMPACT OF CRITICAL INTERACTIONS 
 
 
One type of dialog that might be considered constructive is interactions that contain an element 
of conflict. Conflict, defined here, is the discrepancy between an individual’s expectation and 
what is actually observed. The source of conflict can arise from an individual observing an 
empirical result or through interacting with another person. Certain types of instruction rely on 
conflict as a pedagogical technique. Physics instructors sometimes use demonstrates to provoke 
conflict in their students’ minds. For example, when students are confronted with the following 
scenario, "A hunter with a blowgun is hunting for monkeys. He sees one hanging from a tree. He 
knows that a monkey will always drop from its branch the moment a hunter fires his dart. How 
does the hunter aim his gun to make sure he hits the monkey?" they often mistakenly answer in 
the middle or the base of the tree. The instructor can use the differences in predictions to help the 
students identify their faulty assumptions (Hatano & Inagaki, 1991). Thus, interacting with the 
individual might also serve as a source of conflict. 
1.1.1. Definitions of critical interactions 
A subset of constructive dialogs might contain elements of conflict. At least three different 
classes of interactions have been introduced in the literature that contain conflict. The first class 
of interactions is socio-cognitive conflict (Druyan, 2001; Kruger, 1993; Tudge, 1989). Socio-
cognitive conflict is derived from the Piagetian tradition in which children are observed 
interacting with other children of higher (or lower) levels of development. Development, 
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 according to Piaget, progresses in discrete steps from intuitive understandings based on 
perceptual cues to formal operations that rely on advanced reasoning. The implication is that 
children can be classified into discrete categories, based on their present developmental status. 
For example, children who are classified as conservers understand that physical manipulations 
do not change the quantity of items present. If two rows of checkers are presented to a child and 
an adult experimenter spreads one row of checkers out, a conserver will correctly answer that 
both have the same number of checkers. On the other hand, a non-conserver will answer that the 
longer row contains more checkers. Experiments concerning socio-cognitive conflict often test 
the effects of pairing conservers with non-conservers and observing their interactions and 
cognitive outcomes. Socio-cognitive conflicts sometimes lead to the conserving child convincing 
the non-conserver of the correct answer (Miller & Brownell, 1975), while other times the dialog 
leads to regressions (Tudge, 1989). The child’s ability to localize or not localize the source of the 
conflict might explain the differences in outcome. Thus, children who ignore the conflict are less 
likely to learn from their peer. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of development is a second class of interactions, 
which has gone under the label argumentation. Argumentation is defined with respect to a 
formal structure in which the participants propose a claim (“C”) that is backed by a piece of 
information, or datum (“D), and linked by other information, which is assumed to be true, called 
a warrant (“W”). This formal argument structure, proposed by Toulmin (1958), and adopted by 
others (Voss, Tyler, & Yengo, 1983), can be used to model a debate between two (or more) 
individuals (Keefer, Zeitz, & Resnick, 2000; Leitao, 2003; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; 
Resnick, Salmon, Zeitz, Wathen, & Holowchak, 1993). Argumentation is best suited for 
modeling dialogs in which the knowledge structures of the individuals is fairly well developed. 
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 For instance, one student could propose an argument, to which another student disagrees and 
proposes a counter-argument. To be able to articulate a counter-argument, one must have a well-
developed understanding of the domain (Leitao, 2003). 
An intermediate point between socio-cognitive conflicts and argumentation is a third 
class of interactions, which will be referred to as critical interactions. The term critical 
interactions has not been used in the argumentation literature but is a useful distinction because it 
delineates a type of interaction where the goal of the conversation is not to persuade, but to learn 
a new domain or solve a problem.  
Critical interactions can unfold along several different paths. However, one way to 
organize the trajectories of critical interactions is to consider them in terms of the depth of 
interaction (see Table 1 for an ordered list of critical interactions). At the most shallow level, an 
individual can criticize an idea by offering a counter-suggestion without any justification. This is 
considered the most shallow style of interaction because it does not provide a method with which 
to improve an idea. A slightly less shallow response is to make an attempt to understand a 
speaker’s idea. The listener may ask the speaker to be more precise by asking for clarification of 
ambiguous terms. Once the ambiguity has been resolved, the listener can request justification in 
support of the idea. Asking for a reason is a deeper question than asking for clarification because 
presumably the listener has understood the idea enough to ask for more information. Once the 
listener has understood the speaker’s idea, as the speaker intended, the listener is then in a 
position to evaluate the idea. The overarching goal is that that the speaker and listener attempt to 
produce an idea that is of higher quality than the initial idea. 
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 Table 1. A linear ordering of the depth of critical interactions. 
Critical Statement Goal Depth 
Counter-suggestion Non-collaborative Shallow 
Clarification question Understanding Shallow 
Request justification Understanding Deep 
Evaluation Diagnose worth Deep 
 
1.1.2. Empirical evaluations of critical interactions: Problem solving 
Although the literatures on argumentation and socio-cognitive conflict are fairly extensive, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, the effects of critical interactions on problem solving have not 
been studied directly. However, the effects of the individual components within critical 
interactions (i.e., counter-suggestion, clarification question, request justification, and evaluation) 
have been assessed across different studies. 
The first goal of critical interactions is to introduce, and make comprehensible, ideas into 
the conversational space. Studies by Teasley (1995) and Barron (2000a) provide evidence for the 
existence of this goal. Teasley (1995) compared talking and no-talking individuals and dyads on 
Klahr and Dunbar's (1988) BigTrak task. BigTrak is a programmable toy that moves forward, 
turns, and fires a canon. The challenge to the participants was to discover the function of the 
mystery key, labeled “RPT.” Participants worked with BigTrak until they were confident enough 
to announce the function of the RPT key. To gain a deeper understanding of the processes used 
to discover the function of the mystery key, Teasley coded the dyads’ utterances into several 
different categories. The category relevant to the current discussion is “checks with partner,” in 
which partners asked clarification questions. According to the coding results, about 7% of the 
dialog was dedicated to clarifying ideas. Unfortunately, correlations between the number of 
clarification questions and performance on the dependent measures were not reported, probably 
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 because clarification questions were not part of the experimental goals. However, this study 
demonstrates that interacting dyads actively pursue understanding, and it provides a baseline 
frequency of utterances associated with the pursuit of understanding against which comparisons 
can be made. 
Barron’s (2000a) research illuminated the issue of whether clarification questions 
translated into better problem solving. In her study, Barron asked high-achieving math students 
to collaboratively solve a complex story problem. By contrasting successful and unsuccessful 
triads, Barron found that asking clarification questions was not an effective method of 
interaction. Specifically, she found that the unsuccessful triad produced more clarification 
questions than the successful triad. While this difference did not reach traditional levels of 
significance, it does provide suggestive evidence that asking for clarification may not be an 
effective method of interaction. 
Barron also coded the number of rejections produced by successful and unsuccessful 
triads. A rejection was coded as a response to an alternative solution, which can either be 
accompanied by a justification or not. She found that the unsuccessful triad produced more 
rejections than the successful triad. This suggests that merely dismissing an idea can also be 
detrimental to the success of a collaborative group, possibly because it does not offer any insight 
as to what the group might change to improve the original suggestion. 
 Once the individuals in a collaborative problem-solving group have understood the 
speaker’s message, the members can begin evaluating the ideas. Evidence for requesting 
justification can be found in a study by Okada and Simon (1997). As stated in the introduction, 
they contrasted nominal individuals with dyads and found that the dyads performed the task 
more successfully than the nominal individuals. In addition to analyzing the behavioral 
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 outcomes, they also coded the individuals’ monologs and the dyads’ dialogs. They found that the 
dyads produced more requests for justification than the individuals. Although the results are 
explained by a myriad of factors, request for justification is one component of the interaction that 
may have led to superior performance on the simulated discovery task. 
Vroom, Grant, and Cotton (1969) found positive evidence for the impact of evaluation on 
problem-solving performance. They chose an idea generation task for their problem-solving 
domain. The normative model for brainstorming tasks is to divide the session into two parts: 
generation and evaluation. During the generation phase, members of the group are instructed to 
generate as many ideas as possible. Critique is supposed to be suspended during the generation 
phase. Once a threshold of ideas is reached, the evaluation phase begins. During the evaluation 
phase, members of the group critique each of the ideas. 
Vroom et al. manipulated whether groups interacted or not during the evaluation phase. 
They found that the interacting groups produced ideas of better quality than the nominal groups. 
Their results suggest that interactive evaluations result in ideas of higher quality than 
individually produced evaluations. 
1.1.3. Empirical evaluations of critical interactions: Learning 
In addition to the few studies that have focused on elements of critical interactions and their 
effects on problem solving, there have been several studies that have examined the outcome of 
critical interactions for learning. One of the strongest demonstrations of the effects of critical 
interactions on learning can be found in a study by Schwartz, Neumann, and Biezuner (2000). 
They specifically paired students on the basis of their incorrect rules for comparing decimals and 
fractions with the hope that differences in background knowledge would lead to critical 
9 
 interactions.1 Based on case-study data, Schwartz et al. found that students with different rules 
were more likely to spontaneously engage in critical interactions and discover the correct 
fraction rules than students who had the same incorrect rules. This study is noteworthy because it 
provides evidence that two people, both with incorrect knowledge, can combine their knowledge 
through the use of critical dialog to produce a correct understanding of the target domain. 
Chinn, O’Donnell, and Jinks (2000) found a pattern of similar results.2 They examined 
critical interactions and learning in several small groups by measuring the impact of critical 
interaction on students’ scientific writing. They found a significant, positive partial correlation 
between the quality of collaboratively constructed critical interactions and the outcome measure 
(r = 0.37), while controlling for performance on a transfer problem. The outcome measure was 
the student’s ability to write a conclusion about an experiment they had not previously 
encountered (i.e., a new transfer problem). 
Evidence from a classroom study by Mercer, Wegerif, and Dawes (1999) experimentally 
manipulated students’ interactions. They developed a training procedure for assisting children to 
talk in productive ways. Their training program, called TRAC (Talk, Reasoning, and 
Computers), included elements of critical interactions. For instance, children were encouraged to 
challenge one another, provide reasons for their statements, and discuss alternative ideas. The 
results showed that students trained with the TRAC program had higher gain scores on the 
Raven Progressive Matrices task than a group of control students who were exposed to the same 
curricula, minus the dialog training. Thus, in a classroom setting, they demonstrated that it is 
                                                 
1 While Schwartz et al. originally used the term “argumentation” in the formal structure sense. Because their 
students’ knowledge was under refinement, the term “critical interactions” will be used to be consistent with the 
classification of interactions outlined above. 
2 Chinn et al. also used the term “argumentation” in the formal structure sense. They based their analysis of 
argumentation on Toulmin’s (1958) formalization. 
10 
 possible to train students to converse in particular ways, and that inducing critical interactions 
can help in the development of general reasoning skills. 
Similar effects have also been replicated in the laboratory. In a series of analyses, Chan 
and her colleagues investigated the effects of prior knowledge and grade level on knowledge-
building activities, conflict, and conceptual change (C. Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997; C. Chan, 
Burtis, Scardamalia, & Bereiter, 1992; C. K. K. Chan, 2001). The domain they selected was 
evolution, which is a difficult domain because of the many misconceptions held by children and 
adults alike (Chi, 2005). Information was presented to students that either maximally conflicted 
with their prior beliefs, or was supposed to be easily assimilated into their prior knowledge. The 
researchers coded knowledge-building activities of interacting groups at five levels of depth and 
found that conflict alone did not produce conceptual change, but was mediated by the 
knowledge-building activities in which the students engaged. Through a path analysis, the 
researchers demonstrated that conflict is helpful only insofar as it leads groups of students to 
engage in deep knowledge-building activities. 
1.1.4. A process model of critical interactions 
Although the results from the learning studies reviewed above generally show a positive 
association between critical interactions and learning, there are cases in which being critical does 
not lead to positive learning gains (Barron, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). Indeed, there are good reasons 
to suspect that critical interactions do not always lead to learning. Consider the following process 
model for conflict (see Figure 1, patterned after Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog (1982); Lee, 
Kwon, Park, Kim, Kwon, & Park (2003)). There are four stages for the possibility of conflict to 
11 
 lead to learning. The solid arrows represent positive links, while the dashed lines represent 
negative links leading to the failure of learning from conflict. 
 
1. Is there a 
difference in 
knowledge? 
2. Is the 
difference 
articulated? 
3. Is the 
difference 
detected? 
4. Is the 
difference 
discussed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Process model of conflict during collaborative problem solving. 
 
The first stage is a pre-requisite for conflict. Before two individuals can disagree, there 
must be something to disagree about. Schwartz, Neumann, and Biezuner’s (2000) study nicely 
illustrates this by showing that different prior knowledge is important, even if it is incorrect. 
The second stage states that the differences must be articulated or brought into the 
conversation. Sharing information that is unique to an individual, however, is not guaranteed. 
Work on group decision making suggests that groups, composed of members of varying levels of 
expertise, tend not to discuss unshared information (Stasser, Vaughan, & Stweart, 2000). The 
decision tasks in Stasser’s research are constructed such that the unshared information is critical 
for optimal decisions, often resulting in groups making sub-optimal decisions. 
Stage three is of particular interest. In the face of conflicting information, both adults and 
children often react to conflicting information in striking ways. In the extreme case, some may 
completely dismiss the conflicting data altogether (Chinn & Brewer, 1998). For example, Chinn 
Failure Success 
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 and Brewer (1998) have developed a taxonomy of responses to anomalous data. At the lowest 
level, individuals completely ignore anomalous data. They ignore the data, not because they did 
not attend to it, but because they do not believe the data are relevant to the present issue. That is, 
they fail to see the relevance of the anomalous data with respect to their particular theory. If the 
data are considered relevant, the individual may reject the data because they have an explanatory 
reason for doing so. 
The distinction between ignoring and rejecting anomalous data can be observed in 
children engaged in a balance-beam task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). In the task, the experimenter 
surreptitiously weighted one end of a block of wood with a lead weight, and the child’s task was 
to balance the block of wood. Very young children (4-5 year olds) were able to complete the 
task, mostly through proprioceptive feedback from the block of wood. Their behavior was 
completely driven by a bottom-up, perceptual process; therefore, they were not disturbed by the 
uneven balance. Slightly older children (6-7 year olds) had a more difficult time with the task 
because their “theory” of balance states, “items balance on their geometric center.” When they 
attempted to balance the oddly weighted blocks at their center, the older children found it 
difficult because the wood did not conform to their theory. Thus, when they gave up, claiming 
the task to be “impossible,” they used their explanatory theory to reject the offending data. 
Slightly more advanced than completely dismissing conflicting data altogether, some 
individuals are not aware of the conflict and assimilate the data directly into their background 
knowledge. For example, children can be categorized on the basis of their mental models of the 
human circulatory system (Chi, 2000; Chi et al., 1994; Hausmann & Chi, 2002). Some children 
believe that the heart pumps blood to all the major organs, which includes the liver, kidneys, and 
lungs (i.e., the single-loop model). They do not understand that the lungs are the sites for re-
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 oxygenation of the blood. Thus, when a child reads a statement, such as “The heart pumps the 
blood to the lungs,” they understand the sentence to mean that the lungs are going to receive 
blood as any other organ might. They do not recognize the conflict between their model and the 
model described in the text. Instead, they assimilate that chuck of information directly into their 
mental model. 
Alternatively, individuals might struggle to resolve the incompatible information by 
modifying their prior knowledge. In the developmental literature, for example, it has been shown 
that children attempt to integrate incoming information to be compatible with their current 
representations. For example, Vosniadou (1994) categorized children’s mental models of the 
earth into six discrete categories. Some children believe the earth is flat like a rectangle. When 
asked what would happen if they walked in the same direction for days and days, the flat-earth 
children reliably stated that they would fall off the edge of the earth. As children grow up, they 
hear that the earth is round, which does not make sense according to their rectangular flat-earth 
model. To reconcile the conflict between “roundness” with “flatness,” the children report that the 
earth is still flat, but round like a pancake. 
Collaborators may react in an analogous way to ideas that conflict with their partner. 
Partners may fail to learn from each other during collaboration when one partner’s statement 
conflicts with the other’s underlying representation, and that conflict is ignored, rejected, or 
directly assimilated. Instead, a more productive way to interact with conflicting information is 
for the dyad to attempt to resolve the differences. 
Finally, the fourth stage may be necessary for an interaction to lead to any sort of 
cognitive advancement. It is not enough for two people to “agree to disagree.” Instead, the 
partners must be motivated to discuss their conflicting ideas. The type of dialog the individuals 
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 have may determine the quality of their problem solving or learning. Critical dialog can occur at 
two levels: shallow and deep. 
1.1.5. Critical interactions: Deep versus shallow 
Shallow critical interactions are characterized either by disagreeing without any sort of 
justification or by asking for clarification. Disagreeing without justification might be considered 
shallow. For example, Chinn, O’Donnell, and Jinks (2000) modeled student arguments as a 
network of nodes, where the conclusion was the top-level node with each reason represented as 
individual nodes connected to the conclusion. Conclusions that included several reasons were 
considered “deeper” arguments than conclusions that were either without justification or only a 
single reason was provided. They found a significant correlation between argument depth and 
posttest performance, while controlling for pretest performance. While deeper arguments seem to 
be related to learning, the converse seems to hold as well. That is, shallow arguments have been 
shown not to lead to learning (as will be demonstrated below). 
Deep critical interactions are characterized either by requesting a reason or evaluating a 
partner’s idea. Requesting a reason suggests that the partner has understood the contribution at a 
high level but is unable to evaluate the statement without more information. Thus, the listener 
and speaker work together to make explicit the reasoning behind the speaker’s idea. Once a 
contribution is proposed at a sufficiently high level, the process of evaluation can occur. 
Evaluation represents the deepest level of reasoning because it is computationally the most 
complex. To evaluate a contribution, the individual must first comprehend the statement, and 
then compare it either to information stored in long-term memory or an inference generated from 
the available information. The comparison must then localize the discrepancy between the two 
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 and produce a new contribution that seeks to remove the difference. Of course, evaluative 
statements themselves can differ in depth. But speaking comparatively, evaluation is a deeper 
contribution than asking for clarification, disagreeing without justification, or requesting 
justification. 
Interpreting why some students fail to learn from critical interactions becomes clearer 
when viewed from the perspective of the preconditions (outlined in Figure 1) and the depth of 
the interactions (presented in Table 1). One might expect critical interactions to lead to learning 
when students either do not recognize conflict, or treat the conflict by directly assimilating it, 
rejecting it, or completely ignore it all together. 
The problem-solving literature has shown that, even when there are high amounts of 
conflict, groups can still fail to solve a problem. An example of high amounts of conflict and 
ineffective problem solving can be found most notably in Barron’s study. Barron showed that 
even groups comprised of high-achieving students can fail to solve problems collaboratively 
(Barron, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). In a case-study analysis, a successful triad produced more discuss 
responses than an unsuccessful group. Moreover, the unsuccessful group displayed more ignore-
reject responses than the successful group (Barron, 2003). This suggests that the successful 
groups, while not immune to conflict, reacted to it through discussion, while the unsuccessful 
dyads either ignored or rejected the conflicts. 
Barron’s results accord well with the three reactions to conflicting information outlined 
above (i.e., completely dismiss, assimilate, or resolve conflict). The unsuccessful triads 
completely dismissed the conflict, while the successful students struggled to resolve their 
conflict. Thus, one key feature of successful critical interactions is the development and 
justification of an alterative proposal. Simply rejecting a statement out-of-hand does not lead to 
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 successful problem solving. Thus, there seems to be a curvilinear relationship between critical 
dialog and learning. Too much disagreement can stifle productive dialog, whereas hasty 
agreement can be just as ineffective (Keefer et al., 2000). 
In summary, there are at least two preconditions for learning from critical interactions. 
First, students must produce a fully specified idea for another person to understand and detect a 
discrepancy between the two ideas. Second, the critical dialog should take place at a level where 
the partners are neither too quick to form a hasty agreement nor antagonistic toward one another. 
Furthermore, the dialog should be sufficiently deep that learning is most likely to occur. When 
these preconditions are met, critical dialog should serve as a catalyst for provoking individuals to 
engage in knowledge-building activities, such as explaining or searching for additional 
information. 
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1.2. THE IMPACT OF ELABORATIVE DIALOGS 
 
 
The problem solving and learning literature demonstrated that critical interactions seem to impart 
positive consequences for a group when they are produced at a sufficiently deep level (i.e., 
asking for justification or producing evaluations). Other types of interactions might also lead to 
learning. Several types of non-critical dialogs have been linked with learning, including 
exploratory talk (Mercer, 1996), interpretive talk (Teasley, 1995), and cooperative interaction 
(Forman & Cazden, 1985). Another constructive dialog type that does not contain conflict is 
elaboration (Brown & Palincsar, 1989). Within an interaction, elaboration can be defined as a 
conditionally relevant contribution that significantly develops another person’s previously stated 
idea (Hogan, Nastasi, & Pressley, 1999). What are the cognitive implications of elaborative 
dialogs? Before answering this question, it may be useful to step back and consider how 
elaboration impacts individual problem solving. 
1.2.1. Individual problem solving 
The dominant paradigm for studying human problem solving comes from an information-
processing approach to cognition (Newell & Simon, 1972). This approach, overly simplified, 
suggests that problem solving can be conceptualized as a two-step process. The first step, 
understanding, generates a representation of the problem that is useful to the problem solver. The 
representation includes an initial state, legal problem-solving operators, and finally a goal state. 
The second step, search, is the exploration of the problem space via the iterative application of 
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 the problem-solving operators. It is tempting to conceptualize the two-step process of problem 
solving as a serial process: The understanding process occurs first and produces a useful problem 
representation, upon which the search process takes over and runs until the problem is solved. 
However, during actual problem solving, the individual often pauses to check and potentially 
modify his or her representation (VanLehn, 1989). 
If the problem is novel to the problem solver, the understanding process begins when the 
solver reads the problem statement (Hayes & Simon, 1979). For well-defined problems, all the 
information needed to solve the problem is included in the problem statement. The understanding 
process requires two sub-processes to operate, which serve to generate a fully functional problem 
representation. The first sub-process is the language process. The language process parses the 
linguistic input syntactically, then assigns semantic labels to the constituents, and finally 
integrates the representation into a coherent whole. 
The language process passes the output (i.e., the deep structure of the text) to the second 
sub-process: the construction process. The construction process then augments the representation 
by supplying additional information. The process by which the additional information is added to 
the initial representation can be understood from a text-processing perspective. For instance, in 
the context of prose comprehension, elaborations serve to create connections between sentences, 
create expectations of the text, detect anomalies, and increase the retention of the text (Reder, 
1980). The elaborations are generated from one’s background knowledge. Thus, the same 
processes that are used during text comprehension (i.e., elaboration) might also operate when 
augmenting a problem representation. 
An extreme example of augmenting one’s problem representation can be found in a series 
of studies by James F. Voss and colleagues (Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983; Voss, Tyler, & 
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 Yengo, 1983). They contrasted ill-defined problem solving of domain-relevant experts (i.e., 
political scientists) with experts of a domain that was not relevant to the current problem (i.e., 
chemists). Political scientists, when asked how they might increase crop production in the Soviet 
Union, dedicated 24% of their think-aloud protocol to developing the problem representation. In 
contrast, only 1% of the chemists’ protocols were dedicated to the problem representation. The 
only difference between the two populations was the amount of their domain-relevant 
background knowledge, and this difference in prior knowledge translated into different problem 
solving processes. That is, experts used their vast background knowledge to augment the 
problem representation, which can be measured in their think-aloud protocols. 
Once the problem solver has constructed a problem representation at a high enough level 
of specification, the search process can begin. During the search process, two findings come into 
play. First, the quality of the problem representation has a measurable impact on the probability 
of finding a successful solution (Hayes & Simon, 1977). Second, the solver will return to the 
understanding process when the individual detects a contradiction or runs out of things to try 
(Hayes & Simon, 1979). 
1.2.2. Empirical evaluations of individual elaboration 
What are the implications of elaborative monolog on learning? The cognitive effects of 
elaboration have been studied from three different perspectives: memory, text comprehension, 
and learning. Studies that have addressed the effects of elaboration are presented below. 
 
1.2.2.1. Elaborative effects on memory.  In the context of memory, elaboration serves to 
increase retention by adding partially redundant retrieval cues (Reder, 1980; Stein & Bransford, 
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 1979). Stein and Bransford (1979) argue that not all elaborations are equally effective. They 
contrasted memory for sentences in two different conditions. In the first condition, sentence 
stems, such as “The fat man read the sign” was elaborated with an “imprecise” ending, “that was 
two feet tall.” In the second condition, the same sentence stem was “precisely” elaborated with a 
slightly different ending, “warning of thin ice.” The results indicated that precisely elaborate 
sentences were easier to recall than imprecise elaborations. The difference in the precision of 
elaborations suggests that quantity alone may not be important, but the quality has an effect on 
item strength. 
Seifert (1993) provides evidence that the effects of elaboration generalize to entire textual 
passages. Seifert experimentally manipulated the types of elaborative activities in which his 
participants engaged. Students were instructed to learn from a text about animal characteristics 
and adaptation in three conditions. The first condition was instructed to underline the main ideas 
presented in the text. The second condition was also instructed to underline, but then the text 
contained an extra sentence that was an elaboration of the paragraph. In other words, the 
elaboration was given to the students. The third experimental condition read the same passage, 
but a simple prompt to elaborate the contents of the passage was in the adjacent column (i.e., 
“why”). This was the elaborative interrogation condition. Seifert found that producing 
elaborations helped individuals outperform the other conditions on memory for the main idea 
presented in the paragraph. 
 
1.2.2.2. Elaborative effects on text comprehension.  In the context of text comprehension, 
elaborations help increase comprehension and retention of the text (Reder, 1980). The 
elaborations that are formed during reading are most likely idiosyncratic because they are 
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 generated from an individual’s prior knowledge (J. R. Anderson & Reder, 1979; Reder, 1980; 
Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Stein & Bransford, 1979). In addition to being idiosyncratic, some 
elaborations are easier to generate than others. For example, consider the following text: John 
went into a restaurant. He ordered a salad and iced tea. A simple elaboration would be to infer: 
He = John (i.e., anaphor resolution). A more complex elaboration might include: John is on a 
diet. Simple elaborations are generated automatically, while more complex elaborations require 
effortful processing. 
Different types of elaborations may lead to different types of learning. For instance, 
Hamilton (1997) conducted a study in which he contrasted different types of elaborative 
statements while processing a text. He asked undergraduates to read a text on the topic of 
positive and negative reinforcement. While reading, the participants were instructed to generate 
different types of elaborations: create personal examples from the materials (integrative 
elaborations), contrast the ideas raised in the text (relational elaborations), or expand on the 
effects of the ideas (elaborative interrogation). Consistent with the memory research, relational 
elaborations produced the best performance on a recall of the definitions in the text. Furthermore, 
Hamilton found that the relational elaborations produced the best performance on solving 
application-type questions. 
Implicit in the discussion of the aforementioned studies is some inferential mechanism 
that generates elaborations. How, then, are inferences generated while reading? At least five 
candidate inferential mechanisms might help explain how elaborations are generated. They 
include: inferences from the simulation of a mental model (Norman, 1983), inferences from 
category membership (Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1989b), inferences from analogical reasoning 
(Markman, 1997), inferences from the integration of the situation and text model (Graesser, 
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 Singer, & Trabasso, 1994), and inferences from logical reasoning (Rips, 1990). A simple 
associative mechanism may also account for the production of elaborations. 
 
1.2.2.3. Elaborative effects on conceptual learning.  The studies relating elaboration to 
memory and text processing also seem to hold for learning conceptual domains as well. For 
example, van Boxtel, van der Linden, and Kanselaar (2000) investigated the effects of 
collaboratively producing a concept map in one experimental condition or a poster in a different 
condition. For the concept-mapping condition, they found a significant correlation between the 
definition posttest score and elaborative episodes (r = 0.83). The definition test represented 
shallow learning and the elaborative episodes did not correlate with a deeper measure of learning 
(i.e., essay questions). One way to explain their results is to look at the task demands. Concept 
maps lend themselves to discussions of the links between individual concepts, which suggests 
the individuals would have formed detailed representations of the concepts (i.e., definitions) 
through elaborative activities. 
Stark, Mandl, Gruber, and Renkl (2002) extend these results by providing evidence of 
deep learning. They trained their participants to engage in elaborative behaviors. Individuals 
were trained to give elaborations while studying worked-out examples. After the training, 
participants then applied their study technique to the examples. According to their think-aloud 
protocols, the individuals were categorized according to different elaboration profiles. Stark et al. 
found that individuals who displayed an active, meta-cognitive orientation to the elaboration 
activity performed better on deep, far transfer problems than individuals whose profiles were 
characterized as more passive and superficial. Their finding is encouraging because it suggests 
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 that elaborative activities can lead to deep learning outcomes when the elaborative activities are 
trained. 
1.2.3. Collaborative problem solving 
Returning to the question of how elaborative dialog impacts problem solving, the same processes 
that operate during individual problem solving might also operate during collaborative problem 
solving. For example, members of a dyad may initially construct their own, independent 
representations of the task. Once they begin working on the problem, however, two conditions 
may arise that require them to modify their problem representations. First, the pair may detect a 
contradiction, either between each other or themselves and the task domain. Second, they may 
run out of things to try (Azmitia & Crowley, 2001). If either of these two conditions is satisfied, 
then the pair may be prompted to modify their problem representation. However, instead of 
independently modifying and augmenting their individual representations, the pair will work 
together to augment their shared understanding of the task by elaborating each other’s statements 
(Teasley & Roschelle, 1993). 
Another way in which elaborations may play a role in collaborative problem solving is to 
serve as a method for coordinating the dyad’s actions by displaying evidence that the listener has 
understood the partner’s contribution. During communication, “[t]he contributor and his or her 
partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what the contributor meant to a 
criterion sufficient for current purposes” (H. H. Clark & Brennen, 1991; p. 129). Displaying 
evidence of accepting a partner’s contribution is a continuous function, with low levels of 
evidence on one side of the continuum (e.g., continued attention) and high levels on the other 
(e.g., collaborative completion). Finishing another person’s statement demonstrates a high level 
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 of acceptance. Elaborative statements are sometimes stated as collaborative completions. 
Consider the following exchange from a banking simulation (see Table 2, from McGregor & 
Chi, 2002). Cass presents part of a contribution, which her partner finishes. Dana’s completion 
signals to Cass that she has understood and accepted Cass’s contribution. 
 
Table 2. Example of a socially distributed elaboration 
  Contribution  Propositional Representation 
     
1 Cass: Okay, the new system would give 
the- give the employees... 
 GIVE(SYSTEM, EMPLOYEES, …) 
     
2 Dana: more time to deal with the 
customers. 
 DEAL(TIME, CUSTOMERS) 
 
Another function of an elaboration is to produce an utterance that satisfies Grice’s 
maxims, two of which are relevant here. First, the maxim of quantity states that the individual 
should produce a contribution that is as informative as it needs to be, and no more than 
necessary. However, this is balanced by the second maxim, the maxim of manner, which states 
that the contribution must avoid ambiguity. Therefore, partners should optimally produce 
statements that are short, yet informative and unambiguous. Elaborative statements help satisfy 
these constraints by distributing the specification of the intended message across the speakers. To 
illustrate how this is accomplished, let us consider Cass and Dana’s exchange further. If we 
represent each contribution propositionally, we see that Cass leaves one variable unassigned (i.e., 
a low level of specification). The verb to give requires the assignment of three variables: 1) a 
subject, 2) a predicate, and 3) a direct object. Cass has specified the first two variables (i.e., the 
subject and predicate), while Dana supplies the third (i.e., the direct object). Thus, elaborative 
dialogs in the context of problem solving may serve to produce efficient speech by distributing 
the process of variable assignments over speakers. 
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 1.2.4. Empirical evaluations of collaborative elaborations 
What are the implications of collaborative elaborations on learning? The cognitive effects of 
elaboration have been studied from various perspectives. Studies that have addressed the effects 
of elaboration on memory and learning are presented below. 
 
1.2.4.1. Elaborative effects on memory.  Very few studies have been conducted on the 
impact of collaboratively generated elaborations in the context of memory. O’Donnell et al. 
(1985) provides evidence that the quantity of elaborations has an impact on recall. They 
instructed their participants to elaborate either once or four times during the study phase. They 
found that groups that were instructed to produce multiple elaborations learned their lists better 
than those who elaborated only once. This suggests that the quantity of elaborative statements 
may be important for memory. 
If we expand the definition of “collaboratively generated elaborations” to include outside 
influences, then there has been some research on contrasting self-generated elaborations with 
elaborations presented by the experimenter. One such study found that self- versus other-
generated elaborations tends to depend on the prior knowledge of the individual (Kim & Van 
Dusen, 1998). That is, students with high prior knowledge tend to perform equally well when the 
elaborations are either self- or experimenter generated. Low prior knowledge students, on the 
other hand, tend to recall more information when the experimenter provides the elaborations for 
the student. This makes sense when we consider the source of the elaborations is generated from 
one’s background knowledge (Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979). Thus, low prior knowledge 
students have a limited capacity to generate their own, high-quality elaborations. 
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 1.2.4.2. Elaborative effects on conceptual learning.  In the context of conceptual learning, 
Hogan, Nastasi, and Pressley (1999) reported positive effects of elaborative dialog. They 
classified small-group dialogs along three dimensions. On the lowest end, they coded a dialog as 
consensual when there was a low amount of mutual engagement (i.e., when only one member of 
the group contributed ideas). When two speakers were involved, they coded the dialog as 
responsive. When more than two speakers made contributions that clarified, built upon, or 
corrected each other, the dialog was coded as elaborative. They found that elaborative dialogs 
were more strongly related to higher levels of reasoning complexity than the other two patterns 
(i.e., consensual and responsive).  
Similar results have been found for learning in a hypertext tutoring system. Pairs of 
students learning about glaciation were categorized as “high” and “low” learners according to 
their pre- to post-test change scores. High learners generated nearly twice as many elaborations 
as the low learners (A. Anderson, Mayes, & Kibby, 1995). This result is merely suggestive 
because other differences were also observed between the high and low pairs. For instance, high 
pairs also engaged in more cognitive conflict and more summarizing activities. Therefore, 
elaboration may not be the sole reason for the gain scores, but it may be a significant contributor. 
One method that avoids the contaminating effects of other activities is to experimentally 
manipulate the types of dialogs in which students engage. For instance, Larson et al. (1985) 
trained dyads to interact using either meta-cognitive activities or elaborative activities. They 
found that the elaborative group more accurately recalled information from a science text than 
the meta-cognitively trained dyads. This result accords well with the memory and text 
comprehension literature. 
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 In summary, elaborative dialogs are hypothesized to serve several functions during 
collaborative problem solving. First, elaboration may help dyads modify their problem 
representation as they work together on a task. During individual problem solving, singletons are 
often observed augmenting their problem representation through the application of background 
knowledge, especially when the problem is ill-defined. Second, elaboration may serve to 
coordinate actions by producing high-levels of evidence for accepting a contribution. 
Furthermore, they serve to increase the specification of individual contributions through the 
articulation of unfilled variable assignments, as was illustrated in the banking simulation dialog. 
Finally, elaborative statements may increase the memory strength for particular items when both 
a high number and quality of elaborations are generated. Producing elaborations has also been 
linked to increased reasoning complexity. 
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2. THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF CRITICAL AND ELABORATIVE 
DIALOGS 
 
 
A few questions remain from the literature review. The results from existing research are 
typically correlational, thereby making it difficult to assess the causal impact of elaborative and 
critical interactions on problem-solving performance and learning. Moreover, the effect of each 
type of interaction on deep and shallow learning is typically not assessed. Finally, there are very 
few empirical studies that directly compare the effects of different types of dialog on both 
problem solving and learning. 
To gain a more direct contrast between the impact of critical and elaborative dialog on 
problem-solving performance and learning, the following study experimentally manipulated the 
types of collaborative interactions in which dyads engaged. The study attempted to address the 
following research questions: (1a.) Is it possible to train collaborative partners to interact in a 
specific way? (1b.) Does interaction training have a measurable effect on problem-solving 
performance and/or learning? (2.) Do critical and elaborative interactions lead to quantitatively 
different levels of problem-solving performance and learning relative to a control condition that 
does not receive communication training? 
A singleton condition was also added so that the collaborative results could be compared 
against individuals working in isolation. Although the main focus of the current research is to 
contrast the outcomes of critical and elaborative interactions, it is still important to establish 
whether interactions of any kind leads to improved problem-solving performance and/or 
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 learning. A review of the collaborative problem-solving literature produces mixed results 
regarding the efficacy of collaborative problem solving. Clearly, groups do not always 
outperform the same number of non-interacting individuals. Instead, the effects of working with 
a partner depend on the type of task. Even within the same problem, however, there is a large 
amount of variation in group problem solving. Several proposed hypotheses, both social and 
cognitive, attempt to explain the decrements in problem-solving performance. For example, the 
social psychology literature has proposed several hypotheses about why there is a decrement in 
performance, including groupthink (Janis, 1982); free riding, evaluation apprehension, and 
mutual production blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987); hidden profiles (Stasser et al., 2000); social 
loafing, group polarization, and coordination problems (Oyster, 2000). 
The literature investigating the cognitive components of collaboration, on the other hand, 
has attempted to explain why groups perform well compared to individuals. Some hypotheses 
that have been proposed to explain why groups outperform individuals include superior memory 
capacity in the form of recognition memory (S. E. Clark, Hori, Putnam, & Martin, 2000), 
transactive memories (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996), and cross-cuing (Meudell, Hitch, 
& Boyle, 1995; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Groups have internal error correction and 
monitoring by rejecting incorrect proposals (Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002; Laughlin, 
Zander, Knievel, & Tan, 2003) or by creating different or more abstract representations (D. L. 
Schwartz, 1995; Shirouzu, Miyake, & Masukawa, 2002). Groups may also have multiple 
representations, which may increase the probability of finding a solution (Hill, 1982; Moreland 
& Levine, 1992). Both the social and cognitive explanations intimate that sometimes 
collaborative problem solving is more effective than individual problem solving, while other 
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 times it is not. To shed further light on this pattern of results, the present research will focus on 
contrasting group and individual performance on a problem-solving task. 
The first research question asks if group dynamics can be scripted through interaction 
training. That is, another way to look at group performance, which is not concerned with the 
effects of the group on the individual, is to take the group as an interacting unit. The interaction 
perspective, which combines both the social and cognitive processes, suggests that certain types 
of verbal interactions are more effective than others. Two types of interactions have already been 
reviewed thus far (i.e., conflict-driven and elaborative dialogs). The interaction perspective 
suggests that one way to increase group performance is to script or scaffold the partners’ 
interactions. 
Prior research suggests that, not only is it possible to manipulate collaborative dialogs, 
but doing so can have beneficial effects. Interaction training has been conducted for both 
individual monologs as well as collaborative dialogs. For individuals, Hamilton (1997) and 
Seifert (1993) both experimentally manipulated the types of elaborative activities in which their 
participants engaged through short training procedures. Both found positive effects of 
elaboration on problem solving and learning. Hamilton found a positive impact of relational 
elaborations on problem solving; and Seifert found that producing elaborations helped 
individuals outperform a control group on inferential questions. 
For collaborative dialogs, Stark, Mandl, Gruber, and Renkl (2002) used a 20-minute 
training procedure that instructed participants to engage in different types of elaborative activity 
(i.e., cognitive and meta-cognitive). To train students to produce elaborative interactions, the 
experimenter first modeled the target behavior. Then participants were asked to engage in the 
modeled behavior. The experimenter was present to give the participants detailed feedback, as 
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 well as answer any questions they might have. The control group was instructed on the procedure 
for producing think-aloud protocols, thus controlling for any effect that the experimenter may 
have had on the dialog. Individuals who received elaboration training produced nearly twice the 
amount of elaborations as the control group. Based on the results of their training procedure, it 
seems plausible that an experimenter can shape an elaborative monolog. 
O’Donnell et al. (1985) provides evidence that dyads can also be trained to produce 
elaborations in an interactive setting. As mentioned previously, their participants were trained in 
a particular learning strategy and instructed to elaborate either once or four times during the 
study phase. Based on the results of the study, it is clear that dyads can be trained to elaborate 
during a single-session study. No parallel research has been conducted on whether dyads can be 
trained to engage in critical interactions during a similar time frame. Mercer, Wegerif, and 
Dawes (1999) were able to train children aged 9-10 to challenge each other using the TRAC 
program in 9 1-hour sessions; however, their training procedure included more than just 
criticism. Therefore, the present study will also investigate the differential ease of training 
elaborative and critical dialogs. 
The second research question asks if there is an advantage of one interaction style over 
another. That is, do elaborative or critical interactions lead to better problem solving and/or 
learning than unscripted interactions? While the two have not been compared directly, 
elaborative interactions seem to be favored mainly because there are many points of failure for 
learning from critical interactions. Furthermore, critical interactions are mostly likely to result in 
strong learning gains when they take place at a deep level. However, deep, critical interactions 
may be a more difficult style of interaction because of the need to detect the conflict and struggle 
to resolve the differences. Elaborative interactions, on the other hand, seem to exhibit fairly 
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 consistent results. The results from the memory, text comprehension, and learning literature all 
seem to suggest that elaborative comments help increase both memory strength and 
understanding. 
 
 
 
 
2.1. METHOD 
 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants for the current study were recruited from the University of Pittsburgh’s 
undergraduate psychology subject pool. Participants were randomly assigned to condition, with 
twenty singletons assigned to the individual condition, twenty dyads assigned to the control 
condition, and twenty dyads assigned to each experimental condition, which yielded a grand total 
of N = 140 participants. However, two dyads were excluded from the study because they did not 
follow the experimental instructions. Therefore, the final sample size for each condition is as 
follows: individuals (n = 20), control dyads (n = 20), critical dyads (n = 19), and elaborative 
dyads (n = 19). 94% (128/136) of the sample received course credit for participating, while 6% 
(8/136) were monetarily compensated. 
Dyads were tested in same-sex pairs to control for gender effects (Light, Littleton, Bale, 
Joiner, & Messer, 2000; Scanlon, 2000). Individuals within a pair were unfamiliar with each 
other prior to the experiment to protect against the effects of familiarity (Azmitia & 
Montgomery, 1993; Gould, Kurzman, & Dixon, 1994). Because the hypotheses assume that the 
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 participants were relative novices, students who have taken a course in either civil engineering or 
material science were excluded from participating in the experiment. 
2.1.2. Materials 
2.1.2.1. Simulation.  The domain chosen for the experiment was a design task. The 
participants were asked to design a virtual bridge using a pre-existing software package (West 
Point Bridge Designer 2003). The West Point Bridge Designer software was originally created 
for a competition of high school students interested in civil engineering and was then made 
available to the public. 
The domain of bridge design was selected for several reasons. First, bridge design is an 
open-ended task that does not have a strictly correct answer, yet it affords several dependent 
measures that help quantify designs in terms of their quality, which are described below. Second, 
virtual bridge construction was chosen because it allows for rapid design cycles by eliminating 
the need to cut and bond traditional materials (i.e., balsawood). Third, it was chosen to control 
for prior knowledge. Very few undergraduates have studied bridge construction directly. Fourth, 
pilot testing revealed that it is a highly engaging task. Most undergraduates seem to enjoy the 
task, as evidenced by their questions at the end of the experiment. They usually wanted to know 
how their performance compared with other pairs. An engaging task ensures that individuals will 
interact while solving the problem, which, in turn, allows the experimenter to manipulate and 
analyze the communication patterns more easily. Finally, working within a simulated 
environment allowed for the acquisition of both procedural and declarative knowledge by the 
participants. The knowledge can be easily captured by a content analysis of the software (see 
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 APPENDIX K). Furthermore, the content analysis can be used to construct a formal problem 
space (Newell & Simon, 1972). 
 
2.1.2.2. Content analysis.  APPENDIX K contains a list of 24 concepts that can be derived 
from interacting with the simulation. The list of concepts was developed in two ways. First, the 
information contained in the companion text (Ressler, 2002) included both conceptual and 
procedural knowledge for  redesigning a bridge. Key propositions from the text helped form a 
framework for the content analysis. The text recommends that the student first optimize member 
properties then optimize the shape of the truss. Within optimizing individual member properties, 
several factors come into play, such as the strength, price, and different types of stress (i.e., 
tension & compression). Thus, each of these topics (i.e., strength, price, stress, and 
configuration) formed the topic headings in the framework. 
The details of the framework were made explicit through detailed interactions with the 
software. The author used the software for approximately 40 hours. During that time, careful 
notes were kept that documented the knowledge that was needed to complete the task. Each 
concept is represented under the four topic headings. For example, to establish the relationship 
between member properties (i.e., steel type, bar type, or cross-sectional diameter) and strength, 
the experimenter conducted several small experiments in the simulation. For instance, the first 
concept (i.e., members with larger cross-section are stronger than members with a smaller 
cross-section) was tested in the simulation by increasing the diameter of members under tension, 
then compression, and observing the change in the strength-to-force ratio, which is found in the 
Member List (see button #13 in the screenshot of toolbar found in APPENDIX G). The 
relationship between member properties and strength was conducted for each property and type 
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 of stress. Generalizations from the results of the experiments were then summarized and 
recorded in the Content Analysis. The same procedure was repeated for each of the topic 
headings in the framework. 
 
2.1.2.3. Assessment.  The assessment items were derived directly from the content analysis of 
the simulation. Nearly all of the concepts from the content analysis were transformed into 
questions for the pre- and post-test. The mappings between the concepts based on the simulation 
and their corresponding assessment items can be found in the right columns of APPENDIX K. 
There were six different types of assessment items. Definition questions merely asked the 
participants to provide a definition for key vocabulary terms. The multiple-choice (MC) items 
assessed participants’ ability to validly discriminate between target and distracter items. Rank-
order (RO) items asked the participants to order a list of properties both by cost, then by strength. 
The greater-than-less-than (GTLT) items assessed the participant’s ability to select members that 
were more expensive. Finally, the short answer (SA) questions asked deeper questions about the 
effect of bridge configuration on strength and price. 
To illustrate the process of constructing the questions, consider concept #18: The center 
of the bridge is under more stress than the ends. This piece of declarative knowledge can be 
learned from the simulation by clicking on the Member List (see button #13 in the screenshot of 
toolbar found in APPENDIX G), or it can be inferred by contrasting the color intensity in the 
color-coded feedback for different members. The magnitude of the tensile and compressive 
forces is encoded in the simulation as a continuous change in color intensity in the load test 
mode (contrast the intensity of blue [tension] for Member 1 with the intensity for Member 2 in 
APPENDIX H). Thus, the student can see that the impressed load is the same for both members, 
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 but the middle member is under more stress than the member on the end. To evaluate the 
student’s understanding of this concept, concept eighteen was changed into a question and 
evaluated in the multiple-choice portion of the pre-test and post-test (i.e., MC9). This process 
was repeated to derive all of the items in the right-most columns of APPENDIX K (i.e. the 
pretest and posttest columns). 
 
2.1.2.4. Text.  The text was written by abstracting relevant propositions from a companion text 
to the software (Ressler, 2002). The text that was given to the participants is reproduced in 
APPENDIX C. Certain relationships from the content analysis were made explicit in the text. For 
example, the first concept (i.e., members with larger cross-section are stronger than members 
with a smaller cross-section) was directly stated in the text. There is nearly a one-to-one 
correspondence between the information in the text and the simulation. These items were given 
directly to the participants because the knowledge was easy to assimilate, yet would take time to 
learn from the simulation (i.e., the small experiments the experimenter conducted). 
The concepts that were stated in the text will be referred to as text-explicit knowledge. 
Information that is not directly stated in the text, but is still encoded in the Content Analysis will 
be referred to as inferential knowledge because this type of information needs to be inferred 
either from reading the text or interacting with the simulation. 
 
2.1.2.5. Training instructions.  The training instructions were written to be as concise as 
possible to reduce the load on working memory. Acronyms were used so that the participants 
could easily remember to produce an Idea, Elaborate upon the idea, or Respond to an idea (IER) 
for the elaboration condition. The critical condition was instructed to produce an Idea, Challenge 
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 the idea, or Respond to an idea (ICR). The training instructions for the critical interaction 
condition are reproduced in APPENDIX D, and the training instructions for the elaborative 
interaction condition are reproduced in APPENDIX E. 
The instructions for the elaboration condition were based upon the definition of 
elaboration in the literature (Hogan et al., 1999). There was an added emphasis on the idea that 
incomplete ideas should be made explicit, which comes from the idea that elaborations supply 
variable assignments (see Section 1.2.3). 
The instructions for the critical condition were based upon the various moves in a critical 
interaction (see Table 1). That is, participants were encouraged to ask for clarification, request 
more information, or to disagree with an idea. The top-level goal given to the participants was to 
evaluate the ideas presented during the collaboration. 
 
2.1.2.6. Argumentativeness scale.  The argumentative scale was chosen because it has been 
shown to differential individuals on the likelihood of engaging in critical discussions (Infante & 
Rancer, 1987). This particular scale was included as a control variable because some individuals 
were instructed to engage their partner with critical comments (see APPENDIX B for the 
argumentation scale). 
2.1.3. Design 
The experimental design contained two control conditions and two experimental conditions. The 
first control condition was a simple baseline condition in which individuals completed the task 
without a partner or any communicative manipulation. The second control condition included 
dyads solving the problem together, without any communicative manipulation. For the 
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 experimental conditions, the first included dyads who were instructed to engage in elaborative 
interactions, while the other included dyads who were instructed to engage in critical 
interactions. Except for communication training, all other aspects of the experiment were 
identical for each condition. 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Before the task began, participants were asked to provide informed consent. Once consent was 
granted, the experimenter ensured that neither individual had taken a civil engineering or 
material science course. The experimenter also verified that members of the dyads did not know 
each other prior to the experiment. If either of these two conditions were not met, then both 
individuals were excused from the study. After a brief introduction to the experiment, an on-line 
pretest was administered (see APPENDIX A for the pretest). The pretest was designed to 
measure incoming knowledge of bridge design and material science. 
As stated in the materials section, the knowledge that was assessed on the pre- and post-
test was split into two types, text-explicit and inferential knowledge. The text-explicit 
information included declarative knowledge stated directly in the materials. An example of text-
explicit knowledge includes: Members with a larger cross-section are stronger than members 
with a smaller cross-section (#1). The inferential knowledge was not directly stated in the text, 
but was inferred by interacting with the software. An example of inferential knowledge includes: 
To strengthen a member under compression, add a joint somewhere along the beam (#19). It was 
assumed that inferential knowledge was more difficult to acquire than the text-explicit 
knowledge. 
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 After completing the pretest, participants then completed the argumentation survey. Once 
the pretest and Argumentativeness Scale were completed, the participants read a short text 
individually (see APPENDIX C for the text). 
For the experimental conditions, instructions for engaging in a specific type of dialog 
were given (see APPENDIX D for critical interaction condition and APPENDIX E for 
elaborative interaction condition). After reading the instructions, the experimenter answered any 
questions the participants had. To make the instructions concrete, the participants were given a 
warm-up task, in which the experimenter listened to participant interactions and intervened when 
necessary (see APPENDIX F for warm-up task). The procedure for teaching the communication 
scripts was adapted from Renkl, Stark, Gruber, and Mandl (1998) with one exception; the second 
warm-up problem was excluded. 
After the participants completed the warm-up task, they were then introduced to the 
software in two ways. First, they watched a short QuickTime movie demonstrating the tools and 
features of the interface (see APPENDIX G and APPENDIX H for screenshots of the user 
interface). The experimenter verbally introduced the task and answered any remaining questions. 
The participants were given a pre-existing bridge design (created by the experimenter) and told 
their goal was to optimize the design by attempting to make it as cheap as possible, while still 
being able to carry a load (see APPENDIX I for the problem statement). The participants were 
given 30 minutes to complete the task. Their dialog was videotaped for later transcription. 
The product generated by the collaborative pairs was a single bridge design, which was 
assessed along two dimensions. The first performance measure was the total fabrication cost of 
the bridge. This information was continuously displayed for the participants as an indication of 
their progress (see the top of the screen shot in APPENDIX G). A second measure, which was 
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 more sensitive than the first, was the bridge’s overall load efficiency. This was determined by 
inspecting the internal forces on each individual beam in the bridge. This measure was selected 
because one heuristic for optimizing a bridge in this particular simulation is to maximize the 
internal forces for each member. Thus, higher values indicate that the bridge is close to 
optimization. 
After working on the bridge optimization task for 30 minutes, the participants were asked 
to finalize their design. The final design was saved to the computer’s hard drive. A posttest, 
which was identical to the pretest, was administered individually to measure how much 
information was learned from the text, the simulation, as well as from their interactions (see 
APPENDIX J for a copy of the posttest). Upon completion, the participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and excused from the experiment. 
2.1.5. Measures 
Several different measures were used to capture the problem-solving performance, as well as the 
learning that resulted from reading the text, solving problems, and receiving feedback from a 
simulation. 
 
2.1.5.1. Performance measures.  During problem solving, dyadic activity was measured 
along several dimensions. First, the number of times the bridge design was tested was counted 
(i.e., each time the “test” button was clicked). This measure will be referred to as iterations. 
Second, performance was rated according to two measures: the overall savings and an 
optimization score. Savings was calculated by subtracting the final price of the bridge from the 
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 initial starting value, which was the same for all participants: $256,678.63. Thus, higher savings 
scores indicated better performance on the task. 
 
savings= priceinitial − pricefinal  (1) 
 
To calculate the optimization score, the stress-to-strength ratios for each member were 
summed, which was then divided by the total number of members: 
 
optimization =
stressi strengthi( )
i=1
n∑
n
 (2) 
 
where n = the number of members per bridge. The optimization score represents the average load 
for each member. The optimization score was used in conjunction with the savings variable 
because the optimization score indicates how close a given configuration was to being 
completely optimized (independent of price). Higher optimization scores indicated better 
performance on the task 
 
2.1.5.2. Learning measures.  Two learning measures were used to capture the knowledge 
acquired during the entire experiment. Recall that the participants read a short text after 
completing the Argumentativeness Scale. The information that was explicitly stated in the text 
will be referred to as text-explicit knowledge, which is a shallow type of learning. Information 
that was not explicitly stated, but must be inferred either from reading the text or interacting with 
the simulation will be referred to as inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge represents 
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 deep learning because the participants have to construct the information actively (inferential 
items are demarcated in bold font in APPENDIX K). Gain scores for both text-explicit and 
inferential knowledge were calculated by the following equation: 
 
gain = Spost − Spre  (3) 
 
The gain scores were calculated by summing across all the items within each category (i.e., text-
explicit and inferential) and then the pretest was subtracted from the posttest. The gain scores 
represent the amount of information learned from reading the text and interacting with the 
simulation. 
2.2. RESULTS 
 
 
The results for the present experiment were analyzed using planned comparisons because not 
every pair-wise comparison was of theoretical interest. The analyses were limited to test the 
following research questions: 
1. Is it possible to train collaborative partners to interact in a specific way? 
2. Does receiving interaction training lead to more effective (a) problem solving and/or (b) 
learning, relative to dyads that did not receive explicit interaction training? 
Before testing these research questions, an analysis of individuals and dyads will be presented. 
The same value for alpha will be used for all analyses (α = 0.05). The problem-solving measures 
were evaluated using the dyad as the unit of analysis (n = 68), whereas the learning outcomes 
were measured individually (n = 136). 
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 The results are presented in three major sections. First, the psychometric properties of the 
assessment items and a manipulation check will be presented. Second, a discussion of nominal 
groups analysis will be presented. Third, the effect of interaction training will be presented. 
2.2.1. Preliminary results: Assessment validation 
Seven questions (four definitions and three short answer) were open-ended and nineteen 
questions were multiple-choice. Human graders scored the open-ended questions. Twenty 
percent of the data was selected for reliability analysis; that is, two independent coders scored 28 
pretests and 28 posttests. The correlations between the two raters, for each of the seven 
questions, ranged from r(54) = 0.65, p < 0.001 to r(54) = 1.00, p < 0.001. Differences between 
the two raters were resolved through discussion. Once the discrepant items were agreed upon, the 
author graded the remainder of the assessments. 
In terms of the reliability of the assessment itself, split-half reliability was calculated for 
all of the items separately for the pretest and posttest. The split-half reliability for the pretest was 
low overall (α = 0.31), whereas the split-half reliability for the posttest was slightly higher (α = 
0.52). The reason the split-half reliabilities were low can be explained by the nature of the items. 
There was very little variance in the pretest items. That is, most individuals were unable to 
correctly answer many of the pretest questions. One might not expect a high split-half reliability 
for the posttest items because the questions represented a wide range of knowledge. Some of the 
items asked about the relationship between strength and materials, while other asked about the 
effect of bridge configuration on price. 
2.2.2. Preliminary results: Verbal coding validation 
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 A manipulation check was conducted to see if the communication instructions had their intended 
effects. A stratified sample of the control (n = 8), critical (n = 8), and elaborative (n = 8) 
conditions was taken such that both good and poor performers were equally represented. Several 
types of statements were coded.  
For the elaborative statements, three types were coded (see Table 3 for coding scheme 
definitions and examples). The first type, elaborate suggestion, modified the speaker’s initial 
suggestion by providing a location, an additional change, or a specific value for the proposed 
modification. The second type, provide reason, gave a justification for a particular change. The 
last type, provide implication, gave a consequence for a particular change. The coding scheme 
for the elaborative statements was based on the task analysis. 
 
Table 3. Manipulation check: elaboration coding scheme 
Code Definition Example 
  Elaborate Suggestion Modify speaker’s initial 
suggestion by… 
 
Location …proposing a specific location. A: We could make them thinner. 
B: Change that one right there. 
   
Additional Change …adding an additional change. A: We could make them thinner…  
B: …and hollow, too. 
   
Specific Value …providing a specific value for 
the proposed modification. 
A: We could make them thinner. 
B: Make it 150 millimeters. 
   
  Provide Reason Giving a justification for the 
proposed modification. 
A: We could make them thinner. 
B: Because thinner is cheaper. 
   
  Provide Implication Giving a consequence for the 
proposed modification. 
A: We could make them hollow. 
B: Which will decrease the stress 
here. 
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 For the critical statements, four types were coded (see Table 4 for coding scheme 
definitions and examples). The first type, counter-suggestion, offered an alternative idea to the 
speaker’s most recent suggestion. The second critical comment, clarification questions, the 
listener asked for the speaker to be more precise about a particular suggestion. The third critical 
comment, request reason, was more direct because it asked for a justification for a particular 
suggestion. The fourth critical contribution, evaluation, assessed the viability or worth of a 
suggestion. The first three critical comments were derived directly from the instructions given to 
the participants (see the “Challenge” box from APPENDIX D). 
 
Table 4. Manipulation check: critical coding scheme 
Code Definition Example 
Counter-suggestion Offer an alternative to the 
proposed modification. 
It might be easier to ___. or  
Why don’t we try ___ instead? 
   
Clarification questions Request for speaker to be more 
precise about a proposed 
modification. 
Which members? or  
What do you mean? 
   
Request reason Request for a justification for a 
proposed modification. 
How come? or  
Why do you want to try ___? 
   
Evaluation Assess the viability or worth of a 
proposed modification. 
I don't think that will work at all. 
 
Both the total number of elaborative and critical statements was counted for all three 
conditions. The mean number of elaborative and critical statements is presented in Table 5. To 
determine if the communication manipulation had its intended effects, the following statistical 
method was adopted. The average number of total elaborative and critical statements, taken from 
the control condition, was contrasted with the average number of total elaborative and critical 
statements separately for the elaboration condition and critical condition. 
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 For the elaboration condition, there was not a statistically reliable difference between the 
elaborative and control condition for the number of elaborative statements, t(14) = 1.33, p = 
0.20, d = 0.66; however, the effect size could be interpreted as a “large” effect. Furthermore, 
there was a significant decrease in the number of critical statements generated, t(14) = -2.08, p = 
0.05, d = 1.08. While the elaboration condition was not instructed to avoid critical statements, it 
turned out that they supplanted critical dialog with elaborative statements. 
For the critical condition, the instructions did not have their intended effects (the reasons 
why will be addressed in the Discussion section). The critical dyads produced the same number 
of critical statements as the control condition, t(14) = -0.42,  p = 0.67. Furthermore, the critical 
dyads produced the same number of elaborative statements as the control condition, t(14) = -
0.10, p = 0.91. 
 
Table 5. Manipulation check: average frequencies for elaborative and critical dialogs 
 Condition 
 Control Dyads 
(n = 8) 
Critical Dyads
(n = 8) 
Elaborative Dyads
(n = 8) 
  Elaborate Suggestion 8.12 (6.94) 8.12 (5.17) 12.12 (4.97) 
  Provide Reason 0.12 (0.35) 0.12 (0.35) 0.25 (0.71) 
  Provide Implication 0.87 (1.13) 0.50 (0.53) 1.00 (1.41) 
Total Elaborative 9.12 (7.72) 8.75 (5.47) 13.38 (5.76) 
    
  Counter-suggestion 11.37 (6.78) 9.00 (2.78) 6.25 (5.01) 
  Clarification Questions 28.37 (10.90) 24.37 (12.12) 18.00 (9.71) 
  Request Reason 0.50 (0.76) 2.62 (2.13) 2.00 (1.69) 
  Evaluation 6.25 (3.24) 7.37 (3.85) 4.87 (3.27) 
Total Critical 46.50 (15.17) 43.37 (15.98) 31.12 (13.08) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
The critical dyads performance on all of the performance and learning measures revealed 
non-reliable differences (all Fs < 1). Due to the lack of differences in interaction patterns, 
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 problem-solving performance, and learning between the critical and control conditions, they 
were collapsed into a single control condition (n = 39). Both the nominal and elaborative dyads 
were compared against this control condition. 
2.2.3. Preliminary results: Nominal dyads analysis 
To test the effects of interacting with a partner, the interacting dyads that did not receive 
communication training (i.e., the control dyads) were compared against the nominal dyads. 
Nominal dyad analyses control for the number of ideas produced by each individual; hence, the 
only difference between nominal and real dyads is the verbal interactions between partners. 
Hence, nominal dyads analysis is considered the “gold standard” for making comparisons 
between groups and individuals (Hill, 1982). 
For the present study, nominal dyads were created by randomly pairing individuals, with 
the constraint that they were of the same gender. Gender was added as a constraint because the 
interacting dyads were of the same gender. Once the nominal pairs were created, the pair was 
assigned the highest value from the individual in the dyad for the savings and optimization 
scores. For example, suppose Peter and Brian were randomly paired together in the Individual 
condition. Peter’s optimization score was 0.71 while Brian’s was 0.73, thus Brian’s optimization 
score was assigned to the pair. The same was true for the savings measure; however, the average 
number of iterations was assigned to the pair. The average, instead of the highest value, was 
selected because the number of tests does not ipso facto lead to better designs. 
There are several methods for statistically aggregating individual performance (Lorge, 
Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958), but the best performance was taken under the assumption that 
real, interacting dyads may only rely on the best member’s ideas. To accommodate this 
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 possibility, the best individual member’s performance was used to set a high criterion for finding 
an advantage for interacting with a collaborative partner. 
To test the effects of interaction, the control dyads were compared against the nominal 
dyads. The results for the problem-solving and learning measures for nominal and control dyads 
are summarized in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Average problem-solving and learning gains for nominal and control dyads 
 n Iterations Savings Optimization Text-Explicit Inferential
Nominal Dyads 10 49.55 
(15.13) 
62.13 
(14.15) 
0.63 
(0.09) 
21.43 
(15.72) 
10.56 
(15.07) 
       
Control Dyads 39 36.79 
(13.35) 
46.29 
(22.68) 
0.55 
(0.11) 
27.17 
(14.62) 
7.69 
(17.39) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
There were marginal differences between the nominal and control dyads for savings (F(1, 
65) = 3.81, p = 0.06) and the optimization score (F(1, 65) = 3.11, p = 0.08), both favoring the 
nominal dyads. There was strong evidence that nominal pairs were much more rapid in testing 
their designs. There was a main effect of condition on iterations (F(1, 65) = 5.58, p = 0.02) 
reflecting a greater number of tests for the nominal dyads (M = 49.55, SD = 15.13) than the 
control dyads (M = 36.79, SD = 13.35). Working with a partner thus reduced the number of tests 
that were conducted. In turn, the number of tests conducted was strongly correlated with both 
performance measures (savings, r(66) = 0.72; optimization score, r(66) = 0.65). 
Given that iterations differed for nominal and control dyads, the number of iterations was 
included as a covariate for both of the problem-solving measures. Iterations were not, however, 
used as a covariate for either of the learning analyses because there was no a priori reason for 
suspecting that iterations would lead to better learning. This was supported by the weak 
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 correlations between iterations and text-explicit (r(66) = -0.044) and inferential (r(66) = -0.035) 
learning for the full dataset. 
When iterations were used as a covariate, the marginal differences all became non-
significant. Controlling for the number of iterations, there were no differences in savings or 
optimization scores between nominal and real dyads, Fs(1, 64) < 1.00 (see Figure 2a & 3b). As 
reported above, there were no differences in learning text-explicit or inferential knowledge, Fs(1, 
133) < 2.45, ps > 0.12 (see Figure 2c & 3d). This suggests that the interacting control dyads were 
at least as good as the best nominal individuals, after controlling for the speed at which the 
individuals were able to test their designs. 
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Figure 2. Adjusted means for (a) savings and (b) optimization scores, and average (c) text-
explicit and (d) inference gains for the nominal and real dyads. 
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Collaborative work incurs the cost of coordinating and checking with a partner. The 
upshot of this is that the group may ultimately produce a better product. Furthermore, the penalty 
of time or activity may decrease over repeated collaborative events. In other words, the next time 
the same group gets together, the cost of interacting may be reduced. To test this conjecture, the 
number of iterations that the control condition produced during the first half of the experiment 
was contrasted with the number of iterations from the last half of the experiment. There were 
significantly more tests for the second half (M = 22.57, SD = 9.39) than the first half (M = 14.88, 
SD = 7.07), t(64) = 3.761, p < 0.0004. This suggests that the control dyads became better able to 
coordinate with each other over time. 
2.2.4. The effect of elaborative interactions 
To test the effectiveness of receiving instructions to elaborate, the elaborative condition was 
compared to the control dyads. In terms of problem solving, there was no effect of condition on 
the number of iterations, suggesting the elaborative (M = 41.00, SD = 18.62) and control dyads 
(M = 36.79, SD = 13.35) tested their designs an equal number of times, F(1, 65) < 1. There was 
no effect of condition on savings, suggesting both conditions constructed similarly priced 
bridges, F(1, 65) = 2.08, p = 0.15. On the other hand, there was a main effect of condition on 
optimization score (F(1, 65) = 5.36, p = 0.02) reflecting a higher score for the elaborative dyads 
(M = 0.63, SD = 0.15) than the control dyads (M = 0.55, SD = 0.11). Elaborating a partner’s 
ideas and suggestions increased the dyads’ ability to optimize their particular designs (see Figure 
3b). 
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 In terms of learning, there was no effect of condition on text-explicit knowledge, 
suggesting both conditions learned roughly the same amount of shallow knowledge, either from 
the text or through interacting with the simulation, F(1, 133) < 1.00. On the other hand, there was 
a main effect of condition on inferential learning gains (F(1, 133) = 8.41, p < 0.01) reflecting a 
higher score for the elaborative dyads (M = 17.84, SD = 19.42) than the control dyads (M = 7.69, 
SD = 17.39). Elaborative dialog seemed to help the dyads construct better and deeper 
representations of the task domain (see Figure 3d). 
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Figure 3. Average (a) savings, (b) optimization scores, (c) text-explicit, and (d) inference gains 
for the control and elaborative dyads. 
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 Why did the elaboration condition perform better and learn more than the control 
condition? There are three interrelated hypothesized explanations. The first is related to the way 
in which the elaborative partners interacted. This is an obvious choice because the only 
dimension in which the two conditions differed was their communication patterns. Elaborating 
upon another person’s idea may increase the specificity of each suggested modification. As it has 
already been argued, dyads devoted several turns to negotiate which action to take. In the present 
task, there are at least three variable assignments that need to be made. First, a change needs to 
be specified (e.g., change the type of steel), then a specific value needs to be specified (e.g., from 
carbon steel to high strength low alloy steel), and finally the location needs to be identified (e.g., 
member #12). Each of these variables can take multiple turns to establish. An elaborative 
sequence may come to establish the variable assignments more quickly than one in which the 
partner asks the other to specify the variable assignments. 
To test the efficiency in communication patterns, the number of clarification questions 
was coded in the elaborative and control conditions. Clarification questions were selected 
because the goal of the question is to establish the variable assignments, which is illustrated in 
the following exchange (see Table 7). Beth makes the suggestion that they make some members 
hollow (turn 82). Abby asks which solid members should be changed to hollow (turn 83), to 
which Beth replies that the top member should be changed (84). 
 
Table 7. Clarification question example 
Turn Speaker Contribution  
82 Beth: So these are ah solid tube. Alright, so we can make 
some of these hollow. 
 
83 Abby: The top ones or the… clar_q 
84 Beth: The top.  
85 Abby: Like every other one? clar_q 
86 Beth: Try it…  
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In contrast, consider an elaborative exchange (see Table 8). In this brief exchange, Mike 
proposes that they make the diagonal members a smaller diameter (turn 82). Dan accepts Mike’s 
proposal, and elaborates it by suggesting a location (i.e., the middle, turn 83). They are able to 
make a suggestion and implement it relatively quickly because they can avoid the need to ask for 
clarification. In addition, they are building off one-another’s ideas, instead of fleshing out a 
single partner’s idea. 
 
Table 8. Elaboration example 
Turn Speaker Contribution  
82 Mike: Cause usually, I don’t know, do you want to try making 
the cross members smaller? 
 
83 Dan: Um, we could,- just the ones in the middle not the ones 
on the end. 
elab 
84 Mike: Yeah, right.  
 
The elaboration condition (M = 18.00, SD = 9.71) generated marginally fewer 
clarification questions than the control condition (M = 26.37, SD = 11.32), F(1, 22) = 3.19, p = 
0.09, d = 0.79. Because the elaboration condition asked marginally fewer clarification questions, 
this suggests that the communication instructions had a direct effect on their dialog, which, in 
turn had an indirect effect on their problem-solving performance. 
The second hypothesized explanation is in the way in which the dyads used the feedback 
from the simulation. The most useful feedback for the present task was found in two different 
sources. The first is the color-coded feedback, which was superimposed over the individual 
members, when the user tests a bridge. Recall that the magnitude of the tensile and compressive 
forces is encoded in the simulation as a continuous change in color intensity in the drawing (for 
an example, refer back to the screenshot in Appendix H. The members in the center of the 
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 bottom cord are darker blue than the members at the ends, indicating higher levels of tension.). 
The second source is the Member List in which the information is presented as a ratio of the 
member’s strength to impressed force. An example of the use of the feedback in dialog can be 
found in the following exchange (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Simulation feedback example 
Turn Speaker Contribution 
168 Ben: Let’s see if we can break it. Then we can change them all, 
some of these. 
169 Nathan: Hm-mmm 
170 Ben: Find one that's getting really red. 
171 Nathan: Still not that red, right? 
172 Nathan: This vertical one too, and this vertical one. They're 
still pinkish. 
173 Nathan: We could make them thinner. 
174 Ben: Alright. That's...second 
 
In this example, Ben sets the goal to find a member that is not experiencing much 
compression (i.e., “red”, turn 170). They use this information to select a member to change. 
Once the change was made, they observed the effect by looking at the intensity change (turn 
171). This pair used this information to suggest a location (i.e., a particular member), as well as 
to make specific changes (i.e., the cross-sectional diameter, turn 173). 
To test the hypothesis that the elaborative condition was more effective in exploiting the 
feedback provided by the simulation, the explicit mention and use of the feedback was coded for 
the elaborative and control conditions. The elaborative condition made explicit mention and use 
of the simulation feedback more times than the control condition (see Table 10), F(1, 22) = 4.69, 
p = 0.04, d = 0.80. Because the feedback from the simulation was an effective cue for 
redesigning a cheaper and more optimized bridge design, and considering that the elaborative 
condition explicitly mentioned the feedback at a rate of three times the control condition, this 
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 may help explain why the elaboration condition performed and learned better than the control 
condition. 
 
Table 10. Average frequency of explicit mentioning of simulation feedback 
 Condition 
 Control Dyads 
(n = 16) 
Elaborative Dyads 
(n = 8) 
  Color-coded FB 3.50 (4.10) 8.75 (11.12) 
  Member-list FB 0.00 (0.00) 1.12 (2.47) 
Total Feedback 3.50 (4.10) 9.87 (10.45) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
The third explanation is derived from the types of strategies each condition employed. 
Dyads were categorized as employing either an effective or ineffective strategy. Strategy 
effectiveness was derived from a thorough task analysis. The companion text for the software 
made a few recommendations for optimizing a truss, which was then supplemented with 
protracted interactions with the simulation. The following strategies were coded (see Table 11). 
Positive strategies included: (1) identifying individual members with either a high or low amount 
of stress, which is helpful because it can guide the dyad toward (or away) from modifying certain 
members; (2) only manipulating one feature or property during a single iteration; (3) finding the 
point at which a member fails to help find each member’s optimized load, and (4) making a 
single change and observing the resulting change in price (which also helps with the task of 
making a bridge as cheap as possible). Negative strategies included: (5) removing members or 
joints; (6) adding superfluous members or joints to the existing structure (this is only effective in 
very few instances); and (7) using longer members (because strength decreases as members 
increase in length, especially for members under compression). 
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Table 11. Average frequency of explicit mention of positive and negative strategies 
 Condition 
 Control Dyads
(n = 16) 
Elaborative Dyads
(n = 8) 
1. Identify members with high/low stress 0.12 (0.50) 0.25 (0.46) 
2. Vary one thing at a time 0.31 (0.60) 0.25 (0.46) 
3. Find failure point for individual member 0.37 (0.72) 0.75 (1.75) 
4. Set up & conduct experiments: 
    change property & observe price change 
0.44 (0.73) 1.00 (2.07) 
Positive strategies 1.25 (1.69) 2.25 (4.37) 
   
5. Removing members & joints 5.87 (5.12) 2.62 (3.50) 
6. Adding several members & joints 1.75 (1.84) 1.87 (1.64) 
7. Using longer members  0.69 (1.35) 0.75 (1.75) 
Negative strategies 8.31 (5.61) 5.25 (5.73) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Dyads were categorized based on their explicit mention of the strategies. Each dyad was 
rank ordered for their use of positive strategies. Each dyad in the upper half of the rank was 
assigned a gestalt grade for their search strategy effectiveness. That is, those who frequently used 
positive strategies were categorized as “high;” whereas, dyads in the bottom half of the ranked 
list were categorized as “low.” The frequencies of the dyads classified as using effective 
strategies can be found in the upper half of Table 12. The same method was used for negative 
strategies. The frequencies of the dyads classified as using ineffective strategies can be found in 
the lower half of Table 12. 
The control dyads were more likely to be classified using a negative strategy than the 
elaborative or control dyads, χ2(1) = 4.11, p = 0.04. Additionally, the elaborative dyads were 
more likely to be classified using a positive strategy, χ2(1) = 3.00, p = 0.08. Therefore, it seems 
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 that, at the minimum, the elaborative dyads were most likely to avoid the use of negative 
strategies and potentially engage in positive strategies. 
 
Table 12. Frequencies of dyad classification for positive and negative search strategies 
 Condition 
 Control Dyads
(n = 16) 
Elaborative Dyads 
(n = 8) 
Positive strategies   
  High  6 6 
  Low 10 2 
Negative strategies   
  High 11 2 
  Low 5 6 
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2.3. DISCUSSION 
 
 
The field of cognitive psychology is slowly evolving to include under its purview interactions 
between two cognitive agents. Ericsson and Simon (1980) laid the groundwork for this evolution 
by justifying verbal interactions between people from a theoretical position. However, in that 
same paper, the authors cautioned scientists to be weary of verbal data that included 
verbalizations that provided explanations and justifications for the individual’s actions. It is 
precisely these types of verbalization that are of educational interest, as it has been shown that 
providing explanations can alter an individual’s understanding of a domain (Chi et al., 1989a; 
Coleman, 1998; Webb, 1989). 
When an individual develops an explanation for herself, this type of verbalization is 
referred to as self-explaining (Chi et al., 1989a). The target of the explanation is typically 
oneself. However, in a collaborative problem-solving context, the speaker must consider her 
audience (i.e., her partner). When students attempt to co-generate an explanation together, this 
process might be referred to as a collaborative interaction. 
The learning effects due to collaboration seem to come from two different modes of 
interaction. On the one hand, each individual operates on their partner’s reasoning by elaborating 
one-another’s ideas. On the other hand, the partners can also operate on each other’s reasoning 
by challenging the validity of their partner’s suggestion or idea. These two dialog patterns were 
labeled elaborative and critical interactions in the present study. The background literature on 
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 elaboration and argumentation suggest that each dialog has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
The question is, which will lead to stronger learning gains relative to a control condition? 
In an effort to answer this question, the current study investigated two interrelated 
research questions. Before testing the first research question, problem solving and learning was 
contrasted between real, interacting dyads and nominal, non-interacting dyads. The results 
suggest, after controlling for activity (i.e., iterations), interacting dyads were as good as the best 
individual in a nominal pair. This finding is congruent with literature showing that groups are 
equivalent to the best individual. 
The first research question asked if specific types of interaction can be trained. That is, 
can individuals be taught to be elaborative or critical? Evidence for the first research question 
was mixed. On the one hand, the critical dyads were not able to assimilate the experimental 
instructions such that their interacts were altered. There was no evidence that they were able to 
produce critical statements at a rate that was different from the control condition. On the other 
hand, it was found that dyads who were asked to elaborate were able to assimilate the 
instructions and interact with each other in an elaborative way. Moreover, the elaborative dyads 
were more successful in both problem solving and learning compared to dyads who were not 
given special communication instructions. This finding suggests that it is easier to train college 
undergraduates to elaborate than evaluate ideas. 
The second research question asked if receiving interaction training has a measurable 
effect relative to a control condition that did not receive communication instructions. Again, the 
evidence was mixed. Because the critical condition was not able to implement the instructions, 
their performance was similar to that of the control on all measures of problem solving and 
learning. The elaboration condition, on the other hand, was able to outperform the control 
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 condition on the more sensitive dependent measure (i.e., the optimization score) and the deeper 
measure of learning. 
It is encouraging that a short communication intervention can have a measurable impact 
on at least one type of interaction style (i.e., elaboration). Further research needs to be conducted 
to isolate exactly how elaboration has an impact on problem solving and learning. For instance, 
are there different types of elaboration that are more or less effective for problem solving (i.e., 
precise versus imprecise elaborations, or elaborative completions versus complete statements)? 
Furthermore, are there differences in subsequent learning from different types of elaboration? 
2.3.1. The costs associated with working in a pair 
The results from the preliminary analyses that showed nominal individuals performing better 
than the control conditions warrants further inquiry. Two findings are relevant. First, nominal 
dyads tested more bridges than the interacting dyads. Why were the nominal dyads able to work 
at a faster pace? One possible reason is the need to coordinate ideas and actions when working 
with a partner. One particularly clear example of the cost associated with coordination can be 
found in the following example (see Table 13). The excerpt was taken from the critical 
interaction condition. The first few turns are dedicated to establishing which idea to implement 
(turns 1-6). Then they decide where to implement the idea (turns 7-9). Once the idea and location 
are decided, they must then ground their actions within the simulation (H. H. Clark & Brennen, 
1991; H. H. Clark & Schaefer, 1989) (turns 10-17). All of these processes take time, which is the 
main reason why individuals were able to test more bridges than dyads. 
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 Table 13. Example of idea and action coordination in real dyads 
Turn Speaker Contribution Code 
1 Anne: Okay. So maybe we should make like all this stronger?  Idea 
2 Beth: Hm-mmm. Idea 
3 Anne: I don't know. Idea 
4 Beth: So should we put that back to what it was? And make 
that, or… 
Idea 
5 Anne: Maybe. Do you want to try that? Idea 
6 Beth: Okay. Idea 
7 Anne: Should we do all of them? Or…should we do…I don't know. 
I have no idea if it's gonna work. 
Idea 
8 Beth: Try doing just this triangle in here. Idea 
9 Anne: This? And this? Or just those three? Idea 
10 Beth: Maybe just this Action 
11 Anne: Like that? Action 
12 Beth: Yeah. Action 
13 Anne: To…this one? Action 
14 Beth: Hm-mmm. Action 
15 Anne: Same thing over here? Action 
16 Beth: Hm-mmm. Action 
17 Anne: ‘kay. Action 
 
The observed slowdown for this collaborative task has implications for other studies 
conducted on collaborative problem solving. Generally, experiments that investigate the effects 
of collaboration on problem-solving performance control for time-on-task (Stroebe & Diehl, 
1994) or test it as a possible explanation of the collaborative results (Okada & Simon, 1997). 
However, the results from the present experiment suggest that it is not time that is the crucial 
variable, but something closer to the amount of activity or task engagement. Instead of 
controlling for time, experimenters may consider controlling for activity (however conceived). 
The second relevant finding was that there were at least marginal differences between the 
nominal and real dyads’ performance on both measures of problem solving (before iterations was 
factored out statistically). Why might nominal dyads performed better than interacting dyads? 
There are potentially two interrelated explanations for the lack of group learning differences. 
Before reviewing the explanations it should be noted that, while each dyad had learning gains 
that were significantly greater than zero, there were several items of information that were yet 
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 unlearned (range: 64% – 80%). Thus, the lack of differences cannot be explained by a simple 
ceiling effect. 
The first explanation is based on a cognitive load hypothesis (Sweller, 1994). Interacting 
dyads are faced with several simultaneous tasks: (1) They are learning how to interact with a 
partner in a novel situation, (2) attempting to solve a complex problem, (3) engaging in a dialog, 
which requires the speaker to produce relevant contributions (and, in the critical condition the 
contributions were supposed to conform to a particular style), and (4) trying to learn the 
relationships between bridge price and member strength by manipulating the properties of the 
individual members and their configuration. Because each task in and of itself may require some 
cognitive resources, all of them combined may be a bit overwhelming and does not leave many 
resources available for deep processing of the material. The cognitive load hypothesis suggests a 
simple modification to the procedure. The dyads could be prompted to take periodic breaks and 
reflect on what they have learned so far (Katz, Allbritton, & Connelly, 2003). The cognitive load 
hypothesis would predict that including reflection breaks might produce stronger learning gains. 
Imposing short reflection breaks could be easily implemented in a replication of the current 
study. 
The second possible explanation, which is an implication of the first, suggests that real 
dyads might show stronger learning gains if they are given a delayed posttest. Any additional 
learning, above and beyond the information encoded during the one and a half-hour experiment, 
might occur during post-mortem reflection of experimental content. That is, the individual might 
learn the task-relevant information after the experiment is over, when he or she has the cognitive 
resources to reflect on what was said and done during collaborative problem solving (Azmitia, 
1996). 
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 2.3.2. Effective interaction training 
Another issue raised by the results is the lack of expected performance by the critical interaction 
condition. The literature on argumentation suggests training groups to evaluate suggestions and 
ideas should lead to superior problem solving and learning. According to the results, it appears 
that providing college undergraduates with instructions to elaborate upon one another’s ideas has 
a positive impact on both their problem-solving performance and deep learning. Training an 
undergraduate population to challenge one another, however, did not have the same effect as the 
elaboration instructions. Instead, the pattern of data suggests that the critical dyads were not able 
to employ the communication strategy. There was very little in the dialogs that suggested the 
dyads challenged each other in a deep way. Twenty-three percent of their dialog was coded as 
deep, whereas 77% was coded as shallow. The critical condition produced mostly clarification 
questions and counter-suggestions, both of which are shallow styles of critical interaction. 
Because the critical dyads were unable to implement the interaction instructions, one may 
be left wondering why. To explain why, it is useful to differentiate between internal and external 
collaboration scripts (O'Donnell & Dansereau, 1992). An internal collaboration script is one’s 
own personal style of communication, which is adopted over years of interacting with people in a 
given society or culture. Thus, internal collaboration scripts are culturally bound and 
idiosyncratic, given a person’s past experiences. An external collaboration script is one that is 
provided to the participants during an experiment. An external script is a way of interacting that 
is explicitly taught to an individual. 
One hypothesis why the critical condition did not engage in evaluative behaviors is 
because the undergraduates’ internal collaboration scripts were in conflict with the external 
collaboration scripts provided to them (Dillenbourg, 2002). We can assume the interaction 
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 patterns displayed by the control condition serve as representative of the internal collaboration 
script that most undergraduates bring with them to any given situation. Being asked to be critical 
may impose a style of interaction that is “unnatural.” In so doing, the experiment may have 
imposed an additional load on the dyad. Evidence from two studies supports the conflicting-
scripts hypothesis. 
First, Moreland (2005, May) found an analogous result in a study on transactive memory. 
In one condition, groups were explicitly told to develop a transactive memory system, while the 
control group was not instructed to do so. He found the control group outperformed the 
instruction group. To explain the surprising results, Moreland postulated that the instructions to 
form a transactive memory system disrupted the default group processes. 
The second piece of evidence for the conflicting-scripts hypothesis, which is more 
germane to the issue of argumentation, is a study by Kollar, Fischer, and Slotta (2005). They 
found a main effect for high-structured internal scripts for two of their three dependent measures. 
This suggests that individuals who already have a well-established, internal script for 
argumentation tend to learn more than the students who have a weakly established internal script 
for argumentation. Their interpretation of the main effect, which was effectively a conflicting-
scripts hypothesis, conjectured that learning a well-structured, external collaboration script 
concurrent with the domain-general and domain-specific knowledge reduced the likelihood of 
making deep elaborations of the learning materials. 
The two hypotheses outlined above suggest a few possible directions for future research. 
To test the conflicting-scripts hypothesis, the present experiment could be replicated in a cultural 
population that has a well-established, internal collaboration script that encourages 
disagreements and challenges (e.g. Setlock, Fussell, & Neuwirth, 2004). 
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 2.3.3. How elaboration led to increased problem solving and learning 
As stated in the introduction, elaborative activities enhance learning by increasing an 
individual’s ability to recall information, comprehend a text, and learn conceptual material. A 
similar finding was observed in the present experiment. The elaborative condition answered 
more questions correctly on the inference items than the control condition. How did instructions 
to elaborate lead to better problem solving performance and therefore learning? 
An analysis of the interactions may offer a potential explanation. Specifically, as was 
argued in the introduction, elaboration may serve to more quickly assign variables to unfilled 
slots (e.g., when represented propositionally). The results suggested that elaboration may have 
been effective in filling unassigned variables because the elaborative dyads asked fewer 
clarification questions than the control condition. An example from the protocol showed one 
person making a recommendation for a change, and the other person suggesting specifically 
where to implement the change. Additionally, the results indicate that the elaborative dyads were 
better able to use the color-coded feedback from the simulation. The color-coded feedback is 
helpful in deciding where to implement the changes. 
Combining these two results, making faster variable assignments and better use of the 
simulation’s feedback, we might interpret an exchange between two dyads in the elaboration 
condition in the following way. One person suggests that they modify the member properties by 
changing solid members to hollow beams. The second person may elaborate the suggestion by 
looking at the color-coded feedback and making a recommendation based on the color-coded 
feedback. If the second person makes explicit how she made her recommendation, then the use 
of the color-coded feedback is now available to the dyad for future use. The finding that the 
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 elaborative dyads were more likely to be classified as using positive strategies and less likely to 
be categorized as using negative strategies, supports this interpretation. 
How, then, does effective interactions and use of simulation feedback translate into better 
learning. One interpretation is that the better performance in the simulation allowed the students 
to answer the questions correctly on the posttest. The questions were designed to mirror some of 
the issues the dyads face while solving the design problem. For example, the second short-
answer question asked, Why does adding supports, which themselves experience no internal 
member forces, increase the overall strength of the bridge? The question was targeted at the idea 
that members under compression can be strengthened by bisecting their length with a joint and 
connecting the joint to another member. This knowledge was helpful in optimizing the initial 
design. 
Provided the dyads are exposed to successful problem solving, the elaboration literature 
suggests that the dyads may be more likely to remember and transfer that information to the 
posttest. What is unclear from the current project is if the information that was correctly used on 
the posttest was jointly constructed, and then reproduced by both individuals, or if the 
elaborations only helped increase the memory strength for the individual who uttered the 
elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
2.4. EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
There is increasing awareness in our nation’s schools that collaborative learning is an important 
component to joining the modern workforce (S. G. Cohen & Baily, 1997). One challenge 
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 classrooms face is how to implement collaborative learning into the curriculum effectively. 
Collaborative work is not an easy task because the teacher surrenders a modest amount of control 
when allowing the class to work on their collaborative problem-solving assignments. What does 
the present research recommend for smoothing the transformation of a teacher-driven lecture to a 
more collaborative classroom environment? 
First, it seems clear that groups benefit from a certain amount of structure in their 
conversations. If left alone, students must discover their own interaction styles. While discovery 
works for some groups, it may not benefit all groups equally. Encouraging students to build off 
one another’s ideas is a simple intervention that most college students are willing to adopt. 
Elaborative dialog is an effective method of interaction in terms of both problem solving and 
deep learning. 
However, not all ideas are of equal quality and some level of evaluation will ultimately 
become necessary. If the instructor values evaluation, she must make a few assumptions. First, if 
evaluation is going to arise naturally, it will probably be a rare phenomenon. Second, students 
may be somewhat hesitant to interact critically with one another (Browne & Hausmann, 1998; 
Browne, Hausmann, & Ostrowski, 2002), even when evaluation may have been a part of a 
student’s college education (Keeley, Browne, & Kreutzner, 1982). Thus, argumentation training 
may be best suited if it is not framed using intimidating terms, such as: critical, critique, argue, 
or evaluate. Instead, the teacher should motivate her class to ask specific types of questions (i.e., 
clarification, request reason, etc.) or to challenge one another. The metaphors teachers use to 
instruct critical dialog are extremely important. 
Conflict-driven dialogs might also be best taught using certain computer-mediated 
scaffolds (Fischer, Bruhn, Graesel, & Mandl, 2002). Presenting arguments over the internet, or 
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 with a computer tutor (Ashley, Desai, & Levine, 2002) might also help students become 
comfortable with this style of interaction. Instructing undergraduate populations to argue will 
require more than a single, brief instructional intervention. Furthermore, critical instruction may 
be more effective when friends, rather than strangers, are asked to critique one-another (Azmitia 
& Montgomery, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
2.5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 
Two themes emerge from the study presented here. The first theme is the extension of cognitive 
theory to include an interacting set of individuals. Similar arguments have been made with 
respect to including artifacts found in the environment (Norman, 1993; Zhang & Norman, 1994), 
as well as the system-wide interaction of artifacts and multiple agents (Hutchins, 1995). What 
remains unclear is how the proposed mechanisms for knowledge generation within the individual 
(i.e., inferential mechanisms) can be mapped on to a collection of interacting individuals. It 
would be inappropriate to remove individual cognition from the equation, but it would be equally 
inappropriate to ascribe individual cognitive mechanisms to the collective (Salomon, 1993). 
Thus, there are probably emergent cognitive mechanisms operating within a group. 
The second theme is related to the first. Building dialog into our theories of cognitive 
psychology represents a huge challenge. At this point, it is unclear how utterances are produced, 
or even understood (see Bock & Levelt, 1994; Levelt, 1999 for notable exceptions). Making the 
connections between cognitive theory and dialog production and comprehension, with 
connections to learning, represents an exciting frontier for cognitive science. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Background Knowledge Questionnaire: Pretest 
 
 
 
Participant ID Number:  
 
For your reference, here is a labeled model of a bridge: 
 
 
Provide a definition for the following terms: 
 
 
• Load:  
 
• Tension: 
 
• Compression: 
 
• Failure: 
 
 
Rank order each type of steel, from weakest (1) to strongest (3): 
Strength Rank Order Steel Type 
 Carbon Steel 
 High-strength Low-alloy Steel 
 Quenched and Tempered 
Steel 
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 Rank order each type of steel, from cheapest (1) to most expensive (3): 
Cost Rank Order Steel Type 
 Carbon Steel 
 High-strength Low-alloy Steel 
 Quenched and Tempered 
Steel 
 
Indicate which material is more expensive (>) or less expensive (<). 
1. Hollow Tube  Solid Bar 
2. Longer Member  Shorter Member 
3. Smaller Cross-section  Larger Cross-section 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Choice (Choose the best answer for each question) 
 
 1.    As cross-sectional dimension increases, member strength ____________. 
(a) increases 
(b) stays the same 
(c) decreases 
 
 2.    Hollow tubes have ____________ tensile strength than solid bars. 
 
(a) higher 
(b) same 
(c) lower 
 
 3.    Tensile strength is always ____________ the maximum compressive strength. 
 
(a) greater than 
(b) the same as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 4.    Under compression, longer members are ____________ shorter members. 
 
(a) stronger than 
(b) the same as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 5.    Suppose we took a bridge and made it taller (in the vertical plane), without changing the 
overall configuration. The internal member forces of the top and bottom cords will 
____________. 
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 (a) increases 
(b) stays the same 
(c) decreases 
 
 6.    The top of a bridge is always under ____________, while the bottom is always under 
____________. 
 
(a) compression; compression 
(b) compression; tension 
(c) tension; compression 
(d) tension; tension 
 
 7.    Strength-to-force ratio: a value ____________ one means the member has failed, while a 
value ____________ one means the member can safely carry the load. 
 
(a) greater than; greater than 
(b) greater than; less than 
(c) less than; greater than 
(d) less than; less than 
 
 8.    Under tension, longer members are ____________ shorter members. 
 
(a) stronger than 
(b) the same strength as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 9.    Where does the bridge experience the most stress? 
 
(a) The top cord 
(b) The middle 
(c) The bottom cord 
(d) The two ends 
 
10.    Using members of several different sizes ____________ the overall cost of the bridge. 
 
(a) increases 
(b) does not change 
(c) decreases 
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 Short Answer 
 
 1.    The bridge below (Bridge A) is flawed in a significant way. What might be done to the 
bridge to allow it to carry a load? (Describe your modifications to the bridge in the textbox 
below.) 
 
 
 
 
 2.    Consider two bridges shown below (Bridge B and Bridge C). Their configurations are 
similar, with one exception. Bridge C has 12 additional members. Although none of the 
internal member forces in the diagonals (71kN) change, the bridge is stronger. Why does 
adding supports, which themselves experience no internal member forces, increase the 
overall strength of the bridge? 
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 3.  Since we have considered the members under compression, describe what you might do to 
the members under tension (Bridge C), assuming they are made of solid carbon steel bars 
(160mm)? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Argumentation Questionnaire 
 
Participant ID Number:  
 
This questionnaire contains statements about arguing controversial issues. Indicate how often 
each statement is true for you personally by placing the appropriate number in the blank to the 
left of the statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Almost never true rarely true occasionally true often true always true 
 
 1. While in an argument, I worry that the person I am arguing with will form a 
negative impression of me. 
 2. Arguing over controversial issues improves my intelligence. 
 3. I enjoy avoiding arguments. 
 4. I am energetic and enthusiastic when I argue. 
 5. Once I finish an argument I promise myself that I will not get into another. 
 6. Arguing with a person creates more problems for me than it solves. 
 7. I have a pleasant, good feeling when I win a point in an argument. 
 8. When I finish arguing with someone I feel nervous and upset. 
 9. I enjoy a good argument over a controversial issue. 
 10. I get an unpleasant feeling when I realize I am about to get into an argument. 
 11. I enjoy defending my point of view on an issue. 
 12. I am happy when I keep an argument from happening. 
 13. I do not like to miss the opportunity to argue a controversial issue. 
 14. I prefer being with people who rarely disagree with me. 
 15. I consider an argument an exciting intellectual challenge. 
 16. I find myself unable to think of effective points during an argument. 
 17. I feel refreshed and satisfied after an argument on a controversial issue. 
 18. I have the ability to do well in argument. 
 19. I try to avoid getting into arguments. 
 20. I feel excitement when I expect that a conversation I am in is leading to an 
argument. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Text Materials 
 
Anatomy and Vocabulary of a Bridge 
 
Abutment 
 
Top Cord 
Truss 
Span 
Joint 
Bottom Cord Member 
Deck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Truss: the supporting structure that distributes the load across several members. 
Abutment: the endpoints of the bridge that hold up the structure. 
Top Cord: the top members of the bridge. 
Bottom Cord: the bottom members of the bridge. 
Span: the distance the bridge covers. 
Joint: the point at which members are joined together.  
Member: an individual metal beam. 
Deck: the roadway or surface that carries traffic over the bridge. 
 
Internal Member Forces 
 
1. Load – the force from the weight of the bridge itself (i.e., all the members), plus cars and 
pedestrians. 
 
 
 
 
2. Tension – stretching a material in opposite directions. Tension makes a member longer.  
 
 
3. Compression – squeezing a material together in the same direction. Compression makes a 
member shorter. 
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 Material Science 
 
 The steel that makes up each individual member is based on a cost/strength analysis. In 
general, steel strength and cost have a linear relationship. In other words, the following rule of 
thumb applies: the stronger the steel, the more expensive it is. There are three types of steel used 
in bridge construction: 
 
Carbon Steel 
 
Carbon steel only adds one alloy to the metal, namely carbon. An alloy is an element 
that is added during fabrication, which serves to strengthen naturally occurring iron. 
Carbon steel is the weakest and cheapest of the three metal alloys. 
 
High-Strength Low-Alloy Steel (HSLA) 
 
High-strength low-alloy steel also adds a low amount of carbon to the iron, but it takes 
the fabrication one step further by adding other alloys. High-strength low-alloy is 
stronger and more expensive than carbon steel. 
  
Quenched and Tempered Low-Alloy Steel (QTCS) 
 
Quenched and tempered low-alloy steel share similar properties with high-strength low-
alloy steel in that both use a small percentage of alloys. Tempered refers to the process 
of heat treatment, which helps improve the strength and resistance against corrosion. 
Quenching refers to a cooling process that further hardens the steel by immersing it in 
oil or water. This is the strongest and most expensive of the three types of steel. 
 
Aside from the type of steel, individual members are also made in different shapes, lengths, and 
cross-sectional diameters, depending on the load they must carry. 
 
Hollow Tube 
Small 
Cross-sectional 
Diameter 
Long 
Length Short 
Length 
Large 
Cross-sectional 
Diameter 
Hollow Tube 
Small 
Cross-sectional 
Diameter 
Long 
Length Short 
Length 
Large 
Cross-sectional 
Diameter 
Solid bar Solid bar 
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 The shape (hollow/solid, length, cross-sectional diameter) of an individual member affects both 
the strength and expense. The relationships are summarized below: 
 
 Inexpensive  Expensive 
1 Hollow Tube  < Solid Bar 
2 Shorter Member  < Longer Member 
3 Smaller Cross Section  < Larger Cross Section 
 
1.  Hollow tubes are cheaper to produce than solid bars. It costs less to produce a hollow 
tube because there is less material needed to make a hollow beam.  
 
2.  Shorter members are cheaper than longer members because less material is needed for 
a shorter beam.  
 
3.  Similarly, members with a smaller cross-section are cheaper than members with a 
large cross-section. 
 
The strength of a member depends, in large part, to the stress it is experiencing. Thus, the table 
above can be summarized for each type of stress (i.e., compression & tension). 
 
 Compression 
 Weaker  Stronger 
1 Hollow Tube  < Solid Bar 
2 Longer Member  < Shorter Member 
3 Smaller Cross Section  < Larger Cross Section 
 Tension 
 Weaker  Stronger 
4 Hollow Tube  < Solid Bar 
5 Shorter Member  = Longer Member 
6 Smaller Cross Section  < Larger Cross Section 
 
78 
 Configuration 
 
 In addition to the individual member characteristics, their configuration also has an 
impact on a bridge’s ability to efficiently carry a load. If a load is applied to the simple 
configuration shown below, the diagonal bars will be under compression (C), and the bar that 
connects them will be under tension (T). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider the very simple example of four members, pinned together in the configuration shown 
below. If we place a load on the side of the top member, the shape will easily come out of a 
square configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To make the square structure less susceptible to losing its shape, we can add another member. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By adding a cross-brace, we have effectively transformed the square into two interlocking 
triangles. Because a triangle does not come out of configuration when a side load is applied, it is 
the basis for all bridge designs. 
 
C C 
T 
Applied 
Force 
Applied 
Force 
Applied 
Force 
Applied 
Force 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Instructions: Idea-Challenge-Respond [ICR] 
 
In this experiment, we want you to interact with your partner in a specific way. When appropriate, we want you to 
(politely) challenge your partner’s ideas. To make this style of interaction concrete, let’s call it the ICR style of 
interaction. ICR stands for Idea, Challenge, and Respond. 
 
ID
E
A
 The Idea phase of the interaction is to present ideas to your partner. You could also think of it as making a 
suggestion. The idea phase doesn’t need to include complete ideas or suggestions, but they can be built up over 
several conversational turns. 
 
C
H
A
L
L
E
N
G
E
 The second phase, Challenge, starts when the listener raises a question or objection about an idea. Challenges 
could be of several forms, some of which might include “How do you know ____________?” or “That might 
work, but let’s try ____________ instead.” Challenges might consist of: asking for clarification, requesting 
more information, or to disagree with an Idea. If something doesn’t seem quite right to you, definitely 
challenge your partner. 
 
R
E
SP
O
N
D
 
The Respond phase addresses the challenge or question. This is the speaker’s opportunity to clarify his or her 
initial idea, or search for new information. If the challenger has an idea in mind, you might want to explore that 
as well. 
 
The idea behind the ICR style of interaction is to motivate you to evaluate each other’s ideas. I realize that ICR may 
not be the most natural way to interact, but it can still be a friendly exchange. Below is an example of three people, 
using the ICR method to make a prediction about which object will go faster: 
 
1 Nicola: Now press “ready”. The top weight will go faster. Idea 
2 Paul: Would it? Challenge 
3 Luke: Yes, because it’s smooth. Response 
4 Nicola: Yes, because it’s slippery, it’ll go faster. Yes it 
does. 
Response 
5 Luke: Why? Challenge 
6 Paul: Because if there was a rough surface and the bottom 
one was on ice… 
Response 
7 Nicola: If there was a rough surface, there’s more friction, 
it would slow it down. 
Response 
8 Luke,Paul: Yes.  
 
Obviously, a pre-requisite to this style of communication is to directly address each other, then challenge one 
another. 
 
You will have an opportunity during the warm-up task to practice ICR. I will try to listen and encourage you to use 
ICR. When I hear it, then I will point it out. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Instructions: Idea-Elaborate-Respond [IER] 
 
In this experiment, we want you to interact with your partner in a specific way. When appropriate, we want you to 
elaborate upon your partner’s ideas. To make this style of interaction concrete, let’s call it the IER style of 
interaction. IER stands for Idea, Elaborate, and Respond. 
 
ID
EA
 The Idea phase of the interaction is to present ideas to your partner. You could also think of it as making a 
suggestion. The idea phase doesn’t need to include complete ideas or suggestions, but they can be built up over 
several conversational turns. 
 
E
L
A
B
O
R
A
T
E
 
The second phase, Elaborate, starts when the listener builds upon an idea in a significant way. Elaborations 
extend or make explicit another person’s idea. You might elaborate an idea when you hear something that 
sounds incomplete, in which you feel you could make a significant contribution. 
 
R
ES
PO
N
D
 
The Respond phase addresses the challenge or question. This is the speaker’s opportunity to clarify his or her 
initial idea, or search for new information. If the challenger has an idea in mind, you might want to explore 
that as well. 
 
The idea behind the IER style of interaction is to motivate you to elaborate each other’s ideas. I realize that IER may 
not be the most natural way to interact, but you probably do it all the time. Below is an example of two people, using 
the IER method to solve an electric circuit problem: 
 
1 Ben: An electric circuit has got a voltage source 
too, hasn’t it? 
 
2 Adam: Yes, actually it has.  
3 Adam: (draws)  
4 Adam: And it consists of (writes)  
5 Adam: The voltage source has, gives, gives… Idea 
6 Ben: The voltage sources gives voltage. Elaboration 
7 Adam: And energy. Elaboration 
8 Ben: Yes also. Response 
9 Adam: And current isn’t it? Idea 
10 Adam: The voltage source also gives current. Elaboration 
11 Ben: And due to this current, there is energy. Response 
 
Obviously, a pre-requisite to this style of communication is to directly address each other, then challenge one 
another. 
 
You will have an opportunity during the warm-up task to practice IER. I will try to listen and encourage you to use 
IER. When I hear it, then I will point it out. 
81 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Warm-up Task 
 
In the first part of this study, you will get a chance to practice your style of interaction. To get accustomed to the 
style, we are going to use the following logic problem as a warm-up exercise. Try to collaborate with your partner to 
solve the following logic problem. 
 
Curtis and four of his friends all went on vacation with their families last year. Each vacationed in a different state 
and each enjoyed participating in a different activity (see table below). From the clues, determine each child’s name, 
the state where each spent their vacation, and the activity each enjoyed while away. 
 
Clues: 
 
1. Susie and her family vacationed in Arkansas. 
2. Reneé spent most her time horseback riding. 
3. Michael, who didn’t spend his vacation in Oklahoma, enjoyed spending time at the ice skating rink. 
4. The girl who vacationed in Missouri with her family enjoyed hiking in the Ozark Mountains. 
5. Colorado was the destination of the family who intended to spend most of their time skiing. 
 
Solution: 
 
Name Activity  
A
m
be
r 
Su
si
e 
R
en
eé
 
M
ic
ha
el
 
C
ur
tis
 
ca
no
ei
ng
 
ic
e 
sk
at
in
g 
hi
ki
ng
 
sk
iin
g 
ho
rs
eb
ac
k 
Arkansas           
Oklahoma           
Missouri           
Colorado           Lo
ca
tio
n 
Nebraska           
canoeing           
ice skating           
hiking           
skiing           A
ct
iv
ity
 
horseback           
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
 
West Point Bridge Designer 2003 Screenshot: Design Mode 
 
 
 
Toolbar: Buttons and Commands 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
14
7 
15 8 9 10 131211 
1. Drawing Board – the design mode allows the user to place joints and members. 
2. Load Test Mode – this mode allows the user to simulate a load, which then generates. 
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 3. Select All – selects all members in the current design. 
4. Undo – undo user’s last command. 
5. Iteration Counter – allows the user to go back to previous designs. 
6. Current Bridge Price – the current total price of the bridge. 
7. Bridge Status – after a load test, this will symbolize if it withstood the test. 
8. Material – use the drop-down menu to select a type of metal. 
9. Cross-Section – use the drop-down menu to select the form (solid bar or hollow tube). 
10. Size – use the drop-down menu to select the cross-section diameter. 
11. Increase/Decrease Member Size – quickly increase or decrease the member’s cross-
sectional dimension. 
12. Member Properties Report – this information shows member strength as a function of 
length in graphical form. 
13. Member List – a table of numbered members which shows the tension and compression 
results from the load test. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
 
West Point Bridge Designer 2003 Screenshot: Load Test Mode 
 
 
Member 1 
Member 2
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
Bridge Optimization Instructions 
 
During this part of the experiment, I want you to optimize the design of a preexisting bridge. The 
main issue you will face as an engineer is the total cost of your bridge. As in most real world 
designs, there is a finite budget that you must consider. The program automatically displays the 
price of your configuration in the upper right-hand corner of the screen. The ideal bridge is one 
that can carry a load (represented by the truck), while minimizing the cost. Your challenge is to 
build the cheapest bridge that can withstand the load of the truck. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simulation uses the following color-coded feedback: 
 
Red = compression 
Blue = tension 
 
The initial cost of the bride is: $256,678.63. Your goal is to minimize the cost.  
 
Do you understand what I am asking you to do? Do you have any questions for me? 
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
 
Background Knowledge Questionnaire: Posttest 
 
 
 
Participant ID Number:  
 
For your reference, here is a labeled model of a bridge: 
 
 
Provide a definition for the following terms: 
 
 
• Load:  
 
• Tension: 
 
• Compression: 
 
• Failure: 
 
 
 Rank order each type of steel, from weakest (1) to strongest (3): 
Strength Rank Order Steel Type 
 Carbon Steel 
 High-strength Low-alloy Steel 
 Quenched and Tempered 
Steel 
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 Rank order each type of steel, from cheapest (1) to most expensive (3): 
Cost Rank Order Steel Type 
 Carbon Steel 
 High-strength Low-alloy Steel 
 Quenched and Tempered 
Steel 
 
Indicate which material is more expensive (>) or less expensive (<). 
1. Hollow Tube  Solid Bar 
2. Longer Member  Shorter Member 
3. Smaller Cross-section  Larger Cross-section 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Choice (Choose the best answer for each question) 
 
 1.    As cross-sectional dimension increases, member strength ____________. 
 
(a) increases 
(b) stays the same 
(c) decreases 
 
 2.    Hollow tubes have ____________ tensile strength than solid bars. 
 
(a) higher 
(b) same 
(c) lower 
 
 3.    Tensile strength is always ____________ the maximum compressive strength. 
 
(a) greater than 
(b) the same as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 4.    Under compression, longer members are ____________ shorter members. 
 
(a) stronger than 
(b) the same as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 5.    Suppose we took a bridge and made it taller (in the vertical plane), without changing the 
overall configuration. The internal member forces of the top and bottom cords will 
____________. 
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(a) increases 
(b) stays the same 
(c) decreases 
 
 6.    The top of a bridge is always under ____________, while the bottom is always under 
____________. 
 
(a) compression; compression 
(b) compression; tension 
(c) tension; compression 
(d) tension; tension 
 
 7.    Strength-to-force ratio: a value ____________ one means the member has failed, while a 
value ____________ one means the member can safely carry the load. 
 
(a) greater than; greater than 
(b) greater than; less than 
(c) less than; greater than 
(d) less than; less than 
 
 8.    Under tension, longer members are ____________ shorter members. 
 
(a) stronger than 
(b) the same strength as 
(c) weaker than 
 
 9.    Where does the bridge experience the most stress? 
 
(a) The top cord 
(b) The middle 
(c) The bottom cord 
(d) The two ends 
 
10.    Using members of several different sizes ____________ the overall cost of the bridge. 
 
(a) increases 
(b) does not change 
(c) decreases 
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 Short Answer 
 
 1.    The bridge below (Bridge A) is flawed in a significant way. What might be done to the 
bridge to allow it to carry a load? (Describe your modifications to the bridge in the textbox 
below.) 
 
 
 
 
 2.    Consider two bridges shown below (Bridge B and Bridge C). Their configurations are 
similar, with one exception. Bridge C has 12 additional members. Although none of the 
internal member forces in the diagonals (71kN) change, the bridge is stronger. Why does 
adding supports, which themselves experience no internal member forces, increase the 
overall strength of the bridge? 
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 3.  Since we have considered the members under compression, describe what you might do to 
the members under tension (Bridge C), assuming they are made of solid carbon steel bars 
(160mm)? 
 
 
4.    Have you ever built a bridge before, either for a class project or just for fun? 
 
(a) yes 
(b) no 
 
 If so, how long ago did you build your bridge? years 
 
5.    Have you ever entered a bridge building contest? 
 
a) yes 
b) no 
 
If so, what was the outcome? 
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APPENDIX K 
 
 
 
Content Analysis of West Point Bridge Designer 2003 Simulation 
 
Concept Sim Text Pretest Posttest 
Strength     
1. Members with a larger cross-section are stronger 
than members with a smaller cross-section. 
mMPR p.3-B MC1 MC1 
2. Solid members are stronger than hollow members 
(holding cross-section constant). 
mMPR p.3-B MC2 MC2 
3. Tensile strength is always greater than 
compressive strength. 
MPR Inf MC3 MC3 
4. Shorter members carry a higher load than longer 
members under compression. 
MPR p.3-B MC4 MC4 
5. Tensile strength is constant across member length. MPR p.3-B MC8 MC8 
6. Compressive strength is variable across member 
length (sigmoid function: tanq). 
MPR Inf   
7. Strength: CS < HSS < QTS mMPR p.2-T RO1 RO1 
   RO2 RO2 
   RO3 RO3 
Price     
8. Using fewer bars of different size decreases the 
fabrication cost. 
Δsim; 
CBP 
p.3-T MC10 MC10 
9. Hollow members are cheaper than solid members 
(holding cross-section constant). 
mMPR p.3-T GTLT1 GTLT1 
10. Shorter members are cheaper than longer 
members. 
mMPR p.3-T GTLT2 GTLT2 
11. Members with a larger cross-section are more 
expensive than members with a smaller cross-
section. 
mMPR p.3-T GTLT3 GTLT3 
12. Cost: CS < HSS < QTS mMPR p.2-T RO4 RO4 
   RO5 RO5 
   RO6 RO6 
13. To minimize cost, bring the compression(tension) 
/strength ratio as close to 1.00 as possible without 
going over (p. 4-23). 
Δsim; 
infer 
#17.c. 
Inf   
Stress (Tension & Compression)     
14. Making a bridge taller (vertically), without 
changing the overall configuration, will decrease 
the internal member forces in the top and bottom 
cords (p. 4-30). 
Δsim Inf MC5 MC5 
15. The top of a bridge is always under compression. CFB; 
ML 
Inf MC6a MC6a 
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 16. The bottom of a bridge is always under tension. CFB; 
ML 
Inf MC6b MC6b 
17. Values for the compression(tension)/strength ratio:     
a. < 1.00 safely carries load ML Inf MC7a MC7a 
b. > 1.00 member failure ML Inf MC7b MC7b 
c. = 1 optimal design (within factor of safety) Δsim Inf   
18. The center of the bridge is under more stress than 
the ends. 
CFB; 
ML 
Inf MC9 MC9 
19. To strengthen a member under compression, add a 
joint somewhere along the beam (p. 4-30). 
Δsim; 
infer #4 
Inf SA2 SA2 
20. Increase the strength of steel and reduce the size of 
the members under tension. 
Δsim Inf SA3 SA3 
a. The same is NOT true for members under 
compression. 
Δsim    
Configuration     
21. Squares are easily deformed. EFB p.4 SA1 SA1 
22. Squares can be transformed into rigid structures by 
forming triangles using cross bracing. 
EFB p.4 SA1 SA1 
23. Triangles hold their shape (i.e., not easily 
deformed). 
EFB p.4 SA1 SA1 
24. Triangles are the basis of any bridge design. Infer 21 p.4 SA1 SA1 
 
Source of information from the simulation Key: 
 MPR = Member Property Report (corresponds to button #12 in APPENDIX G) 
  mMPR = Multiple Reports 
 CFB = Color Coded Feedback (corresponds colors in the test mode, see APPENDIX H) 
 ML = Member List (corresponds to button #13 in APPENDIX G) 
 EFB = Error Message Feedback (error feedback from the simulation) 
 CBP = Current Bridge Price (corresponds to item #6 of APPENDIX G) 
 
Text Key (refers to pages of text found in APPENDIX C):  
 T = Top of page 
 B = Bottom of page 
Inf = Inference concept 
 
Pre/Posttest Key (# refers to item on pre/post-test):  
MC = Multiple Choice 
SA = Short Answer 
RO = Rank Order 
GTLT = Greater Than, Less Than 
SA = Short Answer 
 
93 
  
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Aleven, V., & Koedinger, K. (2000). The need for tutorial dialog to support self-explanation. In 
C. P. Rose & R. Freedman (Eds.), Building dialogue systems for tutorial applications.  
Papers from the 2000 aaai fall symposium (pp. 65-73). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press. 
 
Anderson, A., Mayes, J. T., & Kibby, M. R. (1995). Small group collaborative discovery 
learning from hypertext. In C. O'Malley (Ed.), Computer supported collaborative 
learning (pp. 23-38). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Anderson, J. R., & Reder, L. M. (1979). An elaborative processing explanation of depth of 
processing. In L. S. Cermak & F. I. Craik (Eds.), Levels of processing in human memory. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Ashley, K. D., Desai, R., & Levine, J. M. (2002). Teaching case-based argumentation concepts 
using dialectic arguments vs. Didactic explanations. Paper presented at the Intelligent 
Tutoring Systems Conference, ITS ’02. 
 
Azmitia, M. (1996). Peer interactive minds: Developmental, theoretical, and methodological 
issues. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), Interactive minds: Life-span 
perspectives on the social foundation of cognition (pp. 133-162). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Azmitia, M., & Crowley, K. (2001). The rhythms of scientific thinking: A study of collaboration 
in an earthquake microworld. In K. Crowley, C. D. Schunn & T. Okada (Eds.), Designing 
for science: Implications for everyday, classroom, and professional settings (pp. 47-77). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Azmitia, M., & Montgomery, R. (1993). Friendship, transactive dialogues, and the development 
of scientific reasoning. Social Development, 2(3), 202-221. 
 
Barron, B. (2000a). Achieving coordination in collaborative problem-solving groups. The 
Journal of the Learning Sciences, 9(4), 403-436. 
 
Barron, B. (2000b). Problem solving in video-based microworlds: Collaborative and individual 
outcomes of high-achieving sixth-grade students. Journal of Educational Psychology, 
92(2), 391-398. 
 
Barron, B. (2003). When smart groups fail. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12(3), 307-
359. 
94 
  
Bock, K., & Levelt, W. (1994). Language production: Grammatical encoding. In M. A. 
Gernsbacher (Ed.), Handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 945-984). San Diego: Academic 
Press. 
 
Brown, A. L., & Palincsar, A. S. (1989). Guided, cooperative learning and individual knowledge 
acquisition. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning, and instruction: Essays in honor 
of robert glaser (pp. 395-451). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Browne, M. N., & Hausmann, R. G. (1998). The friendly sound of critical thinking. The Korean 
Journal of Thinking & Problem Solving, 8(2), 47-53. 
 
Browne, M. N., Hausmann, R. G. M., & Ostrowski, N. L. (2002). Reframing argument as an act 
of friendship: Overcoming student reluctance to apply critical thinking. The Korean 
Journal of Thinking and Problem Solving, 12(2), 85-94. 
 
Chan, C., Burtis, J., & Bereiter, C. (1997). Knowledge building as a mediator of conflict in 
conceptual change. Cognition and Instruction, 15(1), 1-40. 
 
Chan, C., Burtis, J., Scardamalia, M., & Bereiter, C. (1992). Constructive activity in learning 
from text. American Educational Research Journal, 29(1), 97-118. 
 
Chan, C. K. K. (2001). Peer collaboration and discourse patterns in learning from incompatible 
information. Instructional Science, 29, 443-479. 
 
Chi, M. T. H. (2000). Self-explaining expository texts: The dual processes of generating 
inferences and repairing mental models. In R. Glaser (Ed.), Advances in instructional 
psychology (pp. 161-238). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Chi, M. T. H. (2005). Commonsense conceptions of emergent processes: Why some 
misconceptions are robust. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 14(2), 161-199. 
 
Chi, M. T. H., & Bassok, M. (1989). Learning from examples via self-explanations. In L. B. 
Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning, and instruction: Essays in honor of robert glaser (pp. 
251-282). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P., & Glaser, R. (1989a). Self-explanations: 
How students study and use examples in learning to solve problems. Cognitive Science, 
13, 145-182. 
 
Chi, M. T. H., DeLeeuw, N., Chiu, M.-H., & LaVancher, C. (1994). Eliciting self-explanations 
improves understanding. Cognitive Science, 18, 439-477. 
 
Chi, M. T. H., Hutchinson, J. E., & Robin, A. F. (1989b). How inferences about novel domain-
related concepts can be constrained by structured knowledge. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 
35(1), 27-62. 
95 
  
Chi, M. T. H., Siler, S. A., Jeong, H., Yamauchi, T., & Hausmann, R. G. (2001). Learning from 
human tutoring. Cognitive Science, 25(4), 471-533. 
 
Chi, M. T. H., & VanLehn, K. A. (1991). The content of physics self-explanations. The Journal 
of the Learning Sciences, 1(1), 69-105. 
 
Chiesi, H. L., Spilich, G. J., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Acquisition of domain-related information in 
relation to high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 18(3), 257-273. 
 
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1998). An empirical test of a taxonomy of responses to 
anomalous data in science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35(6), 623-654. 
 
Chinn, C. A., O'Donnell, A. M., & Jinks, T. S. (2000). The structure of discourse in collaborative 
learning. The Journal of Experimental Education, 69(1), 77-97. 
 
Clark, H. H., & Brennen, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. 
Levine & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 127-119). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Clark, H. H., & Schaefer, E. F. (1989). Contributing to discourse. Cognitive Science, 13, 259-
294. 
 
Clark, S. E., Hori, A., Putnam, A., & Martin, T. P. (2000). Group collaboration in recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26(6), 
1578-1588. 
 
Cohen, E. G. (1994). Restructuring the classroom: Conditions for productive small groups. 
Review of Educational Research, 64, 1-35. 
 
Cohen, S. G., & Baily, D. E. (1997). What makes teams work: Group effectiveness research 
from the shop floor to the executive suite. Journal of Management, 23(3), 239-290. 
 
Coleman, E. B. (1998). Using explanatory knowledge during collaborative problem solving in 
science. The Journal of Learning Sciences, 7(3&4), 387-427. 
 
Craik, F. I., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11(6), 671-684. 
 
Diehl, M., & Stroebe, W. (1987). Productivity loss in brainstorming groups: Toward the solution 
of a riddle. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 497-509. 
 
Dillenbourg, P. (1999). What do you mean "collaborative learning"? In P. Dillenbourg (Ed.), 
Collaborative learning: Cognitive and computational approaches (pp. 1-19). Oxford: 
Elsevier. 
96 
  
Dillenbourg, P. (2002). Over-scripting cscl: The risks of blending collaborative learning with 
instructional design. In P. A. Kirschner (Ed.), Three worlds of cscl. Can we support cscl 
(pp. 61-91). Heerlen: Open Universiteit Nederland. 
 
Druyan, S. (2001). A comparison of four types of cognitive conflict and their effect on cognitive 
development. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 25(3), 226-236. 
 
Dunbar, K. (1993). Concept discovery in a scientific domain. Cognitive Science, 17, 397-434. 
 
Fischer, F., Bruhn, J., Graesel, C., & Mandl, H. (2002). Fostering collaborative knowledge 
construction with visualization tools. Learning and Instruction, 12, 213-232. 
 
Forman, E. A., & Cazden, C. B. (1985). Exploring vygotskian perspectives in education: The 
cognitive value of peer interaction. In J. W. Wertsch (Ed.), Culture, communication, and 
cognition (pp. 323-347). New York: Wiley. 
 
Gould, O., Kurzman, D., & Dixon, R. A. (1994). Communication during prose recall 
conversations by young and old dyads. Discourse Processes, 17, 149-165. 
 
Graesser, A. C., Singer, M., & Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences during narrative text 
comprehension. Psychological Review, 101(3), 371-395. 
 
Hamilton, R. J. (1997). Effects of three types of elaboration on learning concepts from text. 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 22, 299-318. 
 
Hatano, G., & Inagaki, K. (1991). Sharing cognition through collective comprehension activity. 
In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared 
cognition (pp. 331-348). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Hausmann, R. G. M., & Chi, M. T. H. (2002). Can a computer interface support self-explaining? 
Cognitive Technology, 7(1), 4-14. 
 
Hayes, J. R., & Simon, H. A. (1977). Psychological differences among problem isomorphs. In N. 
J. Castellan, D. B. Pisoni & G. R. Potts (Eds.), Cognitive theory (Vol. 2, pp. 21-41). New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Hayes, J. R., & Simon, H. A. (1979). Understanding written problem instructions. In H. A. 
Simon (Ed.), Models of thought (Vol. 1, pp. 451-476). New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Hill, G. W. (1982). Group versus individual performance: Are n + 1 heads better than one? 
Psychological Bulletin, 91(3), 517-539. 
 
97 
 Hogan, K., Nastasi, B. K., & Pressley, M. (1999). Discourse patterns and collaborative scientific 
reasoning in peer and teacher-guided discussions. Cognition and Instruction, 17(4), 379-
432. 
 
Hutchins, E. (1995). How a cockpit remembers its speed. Cognitive Science, 19, 265-288. 
 
Infante, D. A., & Rancer, A. S. (1987). Argumentativeness scale. In K. Corcoran & J. Fischer 
(Eds.), Measures for clinical practice: A sourcebook (pp. 36-37). New York: Free Press. 
 
Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes (2nd ed.). 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1992). Positive interdependence: Key to effective 
cooperation. In R. Hertz-Lazarowitz & N. Miller (Eds.), Interaction in cooperative 
groups: The theoretical anatomy of group learning (pp. 174-199). Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1988). The child is a theoretician, not an inductivist. Mind & Language, 
3(3), 183-195. 
 
Katz, S., Allbritton, D., & Connelly, J. (2003). Going beyond the problem given: How human 
tutors use post-solution discussions to support transfer. International Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence in Education, 13, 79-116. 
 
Keefer, M. W., Zeitz, C. M., & Resnick, L. B. (2000). Judging the quality of peer-led student 
dialogs. Cognition and Instruction, 18(1), 53-81. 
 
Keeley, S., Browne, M. N., & Kreutzner, J. (1982). A comparison of freshmen and seniors on 
general and specific essay tests of critical thinking. Research in Higher Education, 17(2), 
139-154. 
 
Kim, S.-I., & Van Dusen, L. M. (1998). The role of prior knowledge and elaboration in text 
comprehension and memory: A comparison of self-generated elaboration and text-
provided elaboration. American Journal of Psychology, 111(3), 353-378. 
 
Klahr, D., & Dunbar, K. (1988). Dual space search during scientific reasoning. Cognitive 
Science, 12(1), 1-48. 
 
Kollar, I., Fischer, F., & Slotta, J. D. (2005). Internal and external collaboration scripts in 
webbased science learning at schools. In T. Koschmann, D. D. Suthers & T. W. Chan 
(Eds.), Computer supported collaborative learning 2005: The next 10 years! (pp. 331-
340). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Kruger, A. C. (1993). Peer collaboration: Conflict, cooperation, or both? Social Development, 
2(3), 165-182. 
 
98 
 Larson, C. O., Dansereau, D. F., O'Donnell, A. M., Hythecker, V. I., Lambiotte, J. G., & 
Rocklin, T. R. (1985). Effects of metacognitive and elaborative activity on cooperative 
learning and transfer. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 10, 342-348. 
 
Laughlin, P. R., Bonner, B. L., & Miner, A. G. (2002). Groups perform better than the best 
individuals on letters-to-numbers problems. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 88, 605-620. 
 
Laughlin, P. R., Zander, M. L., Knievel, E. M., & Tan, T. K. (2003). Groups perform better than 
the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems: Informative equations and effective 
strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(4), 684-694. 
 
Lee, G., Kwon, J., Park, S.-S., Kim, J.-W., Kwon, H.-G., & Park, H.-K. (2003). Development of 
an instrument for measuring cognitive conflict in secondary-level science classes. 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40(6), 585-603. 
 
Leitao, S. (2003). Evaluating and selecting counterarguments. Written Communication, 20(3), 
269-306. 
 
Levelt, W. J. M. (1999). Models of word production. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 3(6), 223-
232. 
 
Light, P., Littleton, K., Bale, S., Joiner, R., & Messer, D. (2000). Gender and social comparison 
effects in computer-based problem solving. Learning and Instruction, 10, 483-496. 
 
Lorge, I., Fox, D., Davitz, J., & Brenner, M. (1958). A survey of studies contrasting the quality 
of group performance and individual performance. Psychological Bulletin, 55, 337-372. 
 
Markman, A. B. (1997). Constraints on analogical mapping. Cognitive Science, 21(4), 373-418. 
 
Mercer, N. (1996). The quality of talk in children's collaborative activity in the classroom. 
Learning and Instruction, 6(4), 359-377. 
 
Mercer, N., Wegerif, R., & Dawes, L. (1999). Children's talk and the development of reasoning 
in the classroom. British Educational Research Journal, 25(1), 95-111. 
 
Meudell, P. R., Hitch, G. J., & Boyle, M. M. (1995). Collaboration in recall: Do pairs of people 
cross-cue each other to produce new memories? Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 48A(1), 141-152. 
 
Miller, S. A., & Brownell, C. A. (1975). Peers, persuasion, and piaget: Dyadic interaction 
between conservers and nonconservers. Child Development, 46, 992-997. 
 
Moreland, R. L. (2005, May). The strategic use of transactive memory systems in groups. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, 
IL. 
99 
  
Moreland, R. L., Argote, L., & Krishnan, R. (1996). Socially shared cognition at work: 
Transactive memory and group performance. In J. L. Nye & A. M. Brower (Eds.), What's 
social about social cognition? Research on socially shared cognition in small groups (pp. 
57-84). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Moreland, R. L., & Levine, J. M. (1992). Problem identification by groups. In S. Worchel, W. 
Wood & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), Group  process and productivity (pp. 17-47). Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall. 
 
Norman, D. A. (1983). Some observations on mental models. In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens 
(Eds.), Mental models (pp. 7-14). Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Norman, D. A. (1993). Cognition in the head and in the world: An introduction to the special 
issue on situated action. Cognitive Science, 17, 1-6. 
 
O'Donnell, A. M., & Dansereau, D. F. (1992). Scripted cooperation in student dyads: A method 
for analyzing and enhancing academic learning and performance. In R. Hertz-Lazarowitz 
& N. Miller (Eds.), Interaction in cooperative groups: The theoretical anatomy of group 
learning (pp. 120-141). London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
O'Donnell, A. M., Dansereau, D. F., Rocklin, T. R., Hythecker, V. I., Lambiotte, J. G., Larson, 
C. O., et al. (1985). Effects of elaboration frequency on cooperative learning. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 77(5), 572-580. 
 
O'Reilly, T., Symons, S., & MacLatchy-Gaudet, H. (1998). A comparison of self-explanation 
and elaborative interrogation. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 23(4), 434-445. 
 
Okada, T., & Simon, H. A. (1997). Collaboration discovery in a scientific domain. Cognitive 
Science, 21(2), 109-146. 
 
Oyster, C. K. (2000). Groups: A user's guide. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
 
Palincsar, A. S., & Brown, A. L. (1984). Reciprocal teaching of comprehension-fostering and 
comprehension-monitoring activities. Cognition and Instruction, 1(2), 117-175. 
 
Phelps, E., & Damon, W. (1989). Problem solving with equals: Peer collaboration as a context 
for learning mathematics and spatial concepts. Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, 
639-646. 
 
Pirolli, P., & Bielaczyc, K. (1989). Empirical analyses of self-explanation and transfer in 
learning to program. In C. M. Olson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th 
100 
 annual conference of the cognitive science society (pp. 450-457). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
 
Pontecorvo, C., & Girardet, H. (1993). Arguing and reasoning in understanding historical topics. 
Cognition and Instruction, 11(3-4), 365-395. 
 
Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a 
scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66(2), 
221-227. 
 
Reder, L. M. (1980). The role of elaboration in the comprehension and retention of prose: A 
critical review. Review of Educational Research, 50(1), 5-53. 
 
Reimann, P., & Neubert, C. (2000). The role of self-explanation in learning to use a spreadsheet 
through examples. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 16, 316-325. 
 
Renkl, A. (1997). Learning from worked-out examples: A study on individual differences. 
Cognitive Science, 21(1), 1-29. 
 
Renkl, A., Stark, R., Gruber, H., & Mandl, H. (1998). Learning from worked-out examples: The 
effects of example variability and elicited self-explanations. Contemporary Educational 
Psychology, 23(1), 90-108. 
 
Resnick, L. B., Salmon, M., Zeitz, C. M., Wathen, S. H., & Holowchak, M. (1993). Reasoning in 
conversation. Cognition and Instruction, 11(3 & 4), 347-364. 
 
Ressler, S. J. (2002). Designing and building file-folder bridges: A problem-based introduction 
to engineering. Defense Dept., Army: United States Military Academy. 
 
Rips, L. J. (1990). Reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 321-354. 
 
Salomon, G. (1993). No distribution without individuals' cognition: A dynamic interactional 
view. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognitions: Psychological and educational 
considerations (pp. 111-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scanlon, E. (2000). How gender influences learners working collaboratively with science 
simulations. Learning and Instruction, 10, 463-481. 
 
Schwartz, B. B., Neuman, Y., & Biezuner, S. (2000). Two wrongs may make a right.If they 
argue! Cognition and Instruction, 18(4), 461-494. 
 
Schwartz, D. L. (1995). The emergence of abstract representations in dyad problem solving. The 
Journal of the Learning Sciences, 4(3), 321-354. 
 
Seifert, T. L. (1993). Effects of elaborative interrogation with prose passages. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 85(4), 642-651. 
101 
  
Setlock, L. D., Fussell, S. R., & Neuwirth, C. (2004). Taking it out of context: Collaborating 
within and across cultures in face-to-face settings and via instant messaging. Paper 
presented at the 2004 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work, 
Chicago, Il. 
 
Shirouzu, H., Miyake, N., & Masukawa, H. (2002). Cognitively active externalization for 
situated reflection. Cognitive Science, 26, 469-501. 
 
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a phenomenon. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4(6), 592-604. 
 
Slavin, R. E. (1990). Cooperative learning: Theory, research, and practice. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Stark, R., Mandl, H., Gruber, H., & Renkl, A. (2002). Conditions and effects of example 
elaboration. Learning and Instruction, 12(1), 39-60. 
 
Stasser, G., Vaughan, S. I., & Stweart, D. D. (2000). Pooling unshared information: The benefits 
of knowing how access to information is distributed among group members. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1), 102-116. 
 
Stein, B. S., & Bransford, J. D. (1979). Constraint on effective elaboration: Effects of precision 
and subject generation. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 769-777. 
 
Stroebe, W., & Diehl, M. (1994). Why groups are less effective than their members: On 
productivity losses in idea-generating groups. European Review of Social Psychology, 5, 
271-304. 
 
Sweller, J. (1994). Cognitive load theory, learning difficulty, and instructional design. Learning 
and Instruction, 4, 295-312. 
 
Teasley, S. D. (1995). The role of talk in children's peer collaborations. Developmental 
Psychology, 51, 207-220. 
 
Teasley, S. D., & Roschelle, J. (1993). Constructing a joint problem space: The computer as a 
tool for sharing knowledge. In S. P. Lajoie & S. J. Derry (Eds.), The computer as a 
cognitive tool (pp. 229-258). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The uses of argument. London/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tudge, J. (1989). When collaboration leads to regression: Some negative consequences of socio-
cognitive conflict. European Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 123-138. 
 
Tulving, E., & Pearlstone, Z. (1966). Availability versus accessibility of information in memory 
for words. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5(4), 381-391. 
102 
  
van Boxtel, C., van der Linden, J., & Kanselaar, G. (2000). Collaborative learning tasks and the 
elaboration of conceptual knowledge. Learning and Instruction, 10, 311-330. 
 
VanLehn, K. (1989). Problem solving and cognitive skill acquisition. In M. I. Posner (Ed.), 
Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 527-579). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Vosniadou, S. (1994). Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. Learning and 
Instruction, 4, 45-69. 
 
Voss, J. F., Greene, T. R., Post, T. A., & Penner, B. C. (1983). Problem-solving skill in the social 
sciences. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in 
research theory (Vol. 17, pp. 165-213). New York: Academic Press. 
 
Voss, J. F., Tyler, S. W., & Yengo, L. A. (1983). Individual differences in the solving of social 
science problems. In R. F. Dillon & R. R. Schmeck (Eds.), Individual differences in 
cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 205-232). New York: Academic. 
 
Vroom, V. H., Grant, L. D., & Cotton, T. S. (1969). The consequences of social interaction in 
group problem solving. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 4(1), 
77-95. 
 
Webb, N. M. (1989). Peer interaction and learning in small groups. International Journal of 
Educational Research, 13, 21-39. 
 
Webb, N. M., & Palincsar, A. S. (1996). Group processes in the classroom. In D. C. Berliner & 
R. C. Calfee (Eds.), Handbook of educational psychology (pp. 841-873). New York, NY, 
USA: Macmillan Library Reference Usa; London, England UK: Prentice Hall 
International. 
 
Wong, B. Y. L. (1985). Self-questioning instructional research: A review. Review of Educational 
Research, 55(2), 227-268. 
 
Zhang, J., & Norman, D. A. (1994). Representations in distributed cognitive tasks. Cognitive 
Science, 18, 87-122. 
 
 
 
 
103 
